Chapter 10.06
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Sections:
10.06.010 Culpability—Definitions.
10.06.020 Substitutes for criminal negligence, recklessness and knowledge.
10.06.030 Culpability—Determinant of grade of offense.
10.06.040 Wilfulness—Satisfied by acting knowingly.
10.06.050 Liability for conduct of another—Complicity.
10.06.060 Criminal liability—Corporations— Persons acting for corporations.
10.06.010 Culpability—Definitions.
A. Intent. A person acts with intent or intentionally when he acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime.
B. Knowledge. A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when:
1. He is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute or ordinance defining an offense; or
2. He has information which would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute or ordinance defining an offense.
C. Recklessness. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation.
D. Criminal Negligence. A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. (Ord. 1145-85 § 15(1), 1985)
10.06.020 Substitutes for criminal negligence, recklessness and knowledge.
When a statute or ordinance provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally. (Ord. 1145-85 § 15(2), 1985)
10.06.030 Culpability—Determinant of grade of offense.
When the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense is committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, its grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any material element of the offense. (Ord. 1145-85 § 15(3), 1985)
10.06.040 Wilfulness—Satisfied by acting knowingly.
A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements plainly appears. (Ord. 1145-85 § 15(4), 1985)
10.06.050 Liability for conduct of another—Complicity.
A. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable.
B. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:
1. Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or
2. He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by this title or by the law defining the offense; or
3. He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense.
C. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:
1. With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, he:
a. Solicits, commands or encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or
b. Aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or
2. His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.
D. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.
E. Unless otherwise provided by this title or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person, if:
1. He is a victim of that offense; or
2. He terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and either gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes a good faith effort to prevent the commission of the offense.
F. A person legally accountable for the conduct of another person may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. (Ord. 1145-85 § 16, 1985)
10.06.060 Criminal liability—Corporations— Persons acting for corporations.
A. As used in this section:
1. “Agent” means any director, officer or employee of a corporation, or any other person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation;
2. “Managerial agent” means an officer or director of a corporation or any other person in a position of comparable authority with respect to the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees;
3. “Corporation” has its ordinary meaning and also includes but is not limited to partnerships, professional service corporations, societies, joint stock associations, and other unincorporated associations whether organized for profit or nonprofit.
B. A corporation is guilty of an offense when:
1. The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of performance imposed on corporations by law; or
2. The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or tolerated by the board of directors or by a managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation; or
3. The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation, other than a managerial agent, while acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation and the offense is one defined by an ordinance which indicates a legislative intent to impose such criminal liability on a corporation.
C. A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in his own name or behalf.
D. Whenever a duty to act is imposed by law upon a corporation, any agent of the corporation who knows he has or shares primary responsibility for the discharge of the duty is criminally liable for a reckless or, if a managerial agent, for a criminally negligent omission to perform the required act to the same extent as if the duty were by law imposed directly upon such agent. (Ord. 1145-85 § 17, 1985)