10 NICS App. 14, HOSTLER v. HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE (February 2011)
IN THE HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS
HOOPA VALLEY INDIAN RESERVATION
HOOPA, CALIFORNIA
Julia Lee Hostler, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Andrew Andreoli, in his individual capacity, and the Hoopa Valley Tribe, Defendants and Appellants.
NO. C-10-001/A-10-003 (February 15, 2011)
SYLLABUS*
Tribal employee whose employment was terminated by Tribe filed a complaint for wrongful termination directly in the Tribal Court after filing an untimely administrative grievance. Trial court ruled that the Tribe had waived sovereign immunity from such suits and denied Tribe’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Court of Appeals holds a terminated employee must file a timely administrative grievance as a prerequisite to invoking the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction under the Tribe’s limited waiver of immunity. Trial court order reversed and suit dismissed.
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Michelle Demmert, Chief Judge; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Judge; Eric Nielsen, Judge. |
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Thomas P. Schlosser, for Appellant Hoopa Valley Tribe; J. Bryce Kenney, Attorney for Appellee |
OPINION
Nielsen, J.:
I. Introduction
The Hoopa Valley Tribe appeals from the trial court’s August 9, 2010 ruling denying its motion to dismiss Julia Hostler’s wrongful termination suit. We reverse.
10 NICS App. 14, HOSTLER v. HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE (February 2011) p. 15
Factual Background and Procedural History
Julia Hostler, a member of the Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe, was employed by the Tribe’s TANF program. On January 5, 2010, Ms. Hostler received a letter terminating her employment. On January 13, 2010, Ms. Hostler filed a grievance under 30 HVTC § 9.2, the Tribe’s codified personal policies. It is undisputed the grievance was untimely because it was not filed within five days of her termination as required under the code.1
On February 4, 2010, Ms. Hostler filed a complaint pro se alleging wrongful termination, violation of equal protection, violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, and harassment. On May 11, 2010, counsel on behalf of Ms. Hostler filed an amended complaint naming the Tribe and Andrew Andreoli, as defendants.2 The amended complaint alleged wrongful termination and harassment.
The Tribe moved to dismiss the wrongful termination and harassment claims against it on sovereign immunity grounds. The Tribe argued the claims were barred by sovereign immunity because Ms. Hostler failed to file a timely grievance, a perquisite to the Tribe’s waiver of sovereign immunity.
On August 9, 2010, the trial court denied the Tribe’s motion to dismiss. The court ruled that because Ms. Hostler filed her suit within 30 days of her termination, under 30 HVTC § 15.1 and 1 HVTC §1.1.04(f), the Tribe waived its sovereign immunity and the court had subject matter jurisdiction.3
II. Standard of Review
Decisions by the trial court are divided into three categories for purposes of the standard of review: questions of law (reviewable de novo); questions of fact (reviewable for clear error) and matters of discretion (reviewable for “abuse of discretion”). Ferris v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 8 NICS App. 1, 2 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. App. 2007) (citing Hoopa Valley Housing Authority v. Doolittle, 7 NICS App. 45, 47 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. App. 2005.); Dodge v. Hoopa Valley Gaming Commission, 7 NICS App. 51, 54 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. App. 2005). The court ruled as a matter of law Ms. Hostler’s wrongful termination suit was not barred by sovereign immunity and therefore the court had subject matter jurisdiction. Our review is de novo. Ferris, 8 NICS App. at 2.
10 NICS App. 14, HOSTLER v. HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE (February 2011) p. 16
III. Decision
This appeal raises the issue left undecided in Ferris. That issue is whether a terminated employee must file a timely grievance as a necessary prerequisite to invoke the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction under the Tribe’s limited waiver of immunity in 1 HVTC § 1.1.04(f) where wrongful termination is alleged.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the Hoopa Valley Tribe from suit unless the Tribe consents to the suit or the Tribe or Congress waives the Tribe’s immunity. Hoopa Valley Housing Authority v. Davis and Sherman, 7 NICS App. 34, 37 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. App. 2005). A waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed. Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, (1980)). It is a canon of sovereign immunity that where the issue is the scope or extent of a waiver of sovereign immunity any ambiguities in the statutory text must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092 (1996); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc, 503 U.S. 30, 33-39, 112 S.Ct. 1011 (1992).
In 1 HVTC § 1.1.04(f)4 the Tribe expressly waives its sovereign immunity from suits by its employees “subject to Title 30” alleging wrongful termination. The Tribe’s Personal Policy Code, Title 30, likewise grants a terminated employee the right to file a complaint “related to their termination” in the trial court “in accordance with “1 Hoopa Valley Tribal Code § 1.1.04(f)” following an appeal of the grievance procedures in 30 HVTC § 9.3.5 30 HVTC § 15.1.6 The limited waiver is conditioned on timely filing a complaint under 2 H.V.T.C §
10 NICS App. 14, HOSTLER v. HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE (February 2011) p. 17
2.3.13(b).7 Ferris, 8 NICS App. at 6; See 30 HVTC §15 (complaints must be filed within 30 days of the date of termination). The issue here is the scope of that limited waiver of sovereign immunity.
The Tribe contends the limited waiver of sovereign immunity in 1 HVTC § 1.1.04(f) is only applicable if a terminated employee first files a timely grievance under 30 HVTC § 9.2.8 It argues that because 1 HVTC § 1.1.04(f) only applies to employees “subject to” Title 30, § 1.1.04(f) is not a “stand-alone grant of authority for the Tribal Court to hear all wrongful terminations complaints against the Tribe” but must be read together with Title 30. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 9. Because 30 HVTC § 9.3 specifically allows a terminated employee the right to “appeal” an adverse decision following the administrative grievance process in 30 HVTC § 9.2, by filing a wrongful termination complaint, the Tribe argues a timely grievance is a prerequisite to the limited waiver of immunity in 1 HVTC § 1.1.04(f). Id.
Ms. Hostler argues the limited waiver of immunity in 1 HVTC §1.1.04(f) inures to the benefit of any terminated employee regardless of whether the employee timely files a grievance under 30 HVTC § 9.2. Appellee’s Brief at 4. She argues the “subject to” language in 1 HVTC § 1.1.04(f) only refers to that class of employees who fall within the Tribe’s personnel policies as codified in Title 30 and should not be read as a requirement that the terminated employee follow the administrative grievance procedures in that Title. Id. at 5.
In Ferris, the terminated employee, Boyd Ferris, timely filed a grievance under Title 30, but a decision on the grievance was issued more than 30 days from the date he was notified of his termination. Within 30 days from the date of the adverse decision on his grievance Ferris filed a complaint for wrongful termination. Under 30 HVTC § 9.3, 30 HVTC § 15.1 and 2 HVTC § 2.3.13(b), a complaint for wrongful termination must be filed within 30 days from date
10 NICS App. 14, HOSTLER v. HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE (February 2011) p. 18
of termination to invoke the limited waiver of sovereign immunity in 1 HVTC § 1.1.04(f). The trial court ruled because the complaint was filed more than 30 days from the date of the notice of termination, Ferris’ complaint was time barred and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
The Ferris court found an apparent conflict in the codes.
On the one hand, an employee is required to file an appeal of a termination “within 30 days of the employee’s termination” in order to preserve the right to judicial review following the administrative grievance process in 30 HVTC § 9.2. On the other hand, because 30 HVTC §9.2 places no time limits on the first step in this administrative grievance process, it is possible that the process may last longer than 30 days from the date the employee receives the termination notice.
Ferris, 8 NICS App. at 5.
The Ferris court harmonized the apparent conflict reasoning that if an employee exercises the administrative grievance procedures the termination decision only becomes final when the grievance process has concluded. The Ferris court held the “date of termination” as used in the codes was the date a terminated employee received a final adverse decision following the grievance process. Ferris, 8 NICS App. at 6-7.
The Ferris court recognized it “also appears that a terminated employee may seek direct judicial review of the termination decision under 1 HVTC § 1.1.04(f) and 30 HVTC § 15.1 without first using the administrative grievance procedures in 30 HVTC § 9.2.” Ferris, 8 NICS App. at 5. The court, however, noted in that respect the code lacks clarity and that it was not deciding the issue of a terminated employee’s right under 30 HVTC § 15.1 and 1 HVTC § 1.1.04(f) to file a wrongful termination suit in tribal court without first filing a timely grievance. Id. at 5, n. 4. That is the issue in this case.
This Court’s primary duty in interpreting any provision of the Hoopa Valley Tribal Code is to discern and implement the intent of the Tribal Council that enacted the code provision. Ferris, 8 NICS App. at 6. If a code’s plain language and ordinary meaning is clear we look only to the language to determine intent because the language itself provides the most reliable evidence of the intent of the Tribal Council. Id.; Matilton v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 7 NICS App. at 69. “Where two or more existing code provisions appear to conflict, we have a duty to harmonize them to give effect to each code provision, if by doing so we preserve the sense and purpose of the code provisions and the code as a whole.” Ferris, 8 NICS App. at 5 (citation omitted). “It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31, 122 S.Ct. 441, 151 (2001). We must read provisions of a statute together to determine the legislative intent underlying the entire statutory scheme to achieve a unified statutory scheme.
10 NICS App. 14, HOSTLER v. HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE (February 2011) p. 19
Under 1 HVTC § 1.1.04(f), together with 2 HVTC § 2.3.13(b), the Tribe has expressly waived its sovereign immunity in wrongful termination suits brought by its employees who are subject to Title 30 where the suit is filed within 30 days of termination. Although the phrase “subject to Title 30” can be narrowly read to mean a class of employees and nothing more, to do so would render the detailed grievance process in 30 HVTC § 9.2 merely optional. It is illogical the Tribe would establish a detailed grievance process but make it optional. Such a narrow reading would also render superfluous that part of 30 HVTC § 9.3 that specifically allows a terminated employee the right to “appeal” an adverse decision following a 30 HVTC § 9.2 grievance by filing a wrongful termination suit if the Tribe had already waived its immunity from such suits in 1 HVTC § 1.1.04(f). Moreover, even if the “subject to Title 30” language in 1 HVTC § 1.1.04(f) is ambiguous and can be read as merely limiting the class of employees who are entitled to file a wrongful termination suit, it can also be read to mean its limited waiver of immunity is only applicable if an employee has complied with the grievance procedures in Title 30. Because it can be read to require compliance with Title 30’s grievance procedures, it must be construed in favor of the Tribe’s sovereignty.
We now answer the question left undecided in Ferris and hold that a terminated employee must file a timely grievance before invoking the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction under the Tribe’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity in 1 HVTC § 1.1.04(f). Our holding harmonizes 1 HVTC § 1.1.04(f) with Title 30, is consistent with the Tribe’s intent to provide both an administrative grievance procedure to resolve employment termination disputes and judicial review of a termination decision, and is supported by the “subject to Title 30” language in 1 HVTC § 1.1.04(f) and canon of sovereign immunity.
IV. Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s ruling and dismiss Ms. Hostler’s wrongful termination suit against the Tribe.
The syllabus is not a part of the Court’s Opinion. The syllabus is a summary of the Opinion prepared by the publishers of this reporter only for the convenience of the reader. Therefore, the syllabus should not be cited in whole or part as legal authority. Only the Opinion, which follows the syllabus, may be cited as legal authority.
Under 30 HVTC § 9.2, if a grievance is not timely filed it is deemed withdrawn.
Apparently, Andrew Andreoli, the Tribe’s TANF Executive Director, was never served.
The court also struck Ms. Hostler’s equal protection and Fair Labor Standards Act claims and did not address the harassment claim. Those rulings are not part of this appeal.
1 HVTC §1.1.04(f) provides:
The Hoopa Valley Tribe hereby makes a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for actions brought in the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court solely based on the employee’s wrongful termination from employment. The Employee must be subject to Title 30 of the Hoopa Valley Tribal Code, otherwise known as the Tribe’s Personnel Policies and Procedures. * * * This limited waiver of sovereign immunity shall only apply to timely filed complaints in accordance with 2 H.V.T.C § 2.3.13(b). If a complaint is not filed according to 2 H.V.T.C § 2.3.13(b), this Court shall have no jurisdiction over the suit and it shall be dismissed.
That provision reads:
This section shall only apply in cases where an employee or program manager [sic] employment has been terminated. After appealing a termination according to the time frames set out in * * * §9.2 of this section all non-introductory, full-time or part-time, regular employees and program managers if they choose to appeal their grievance may file a complaint in the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court according to §15.1 of this Title. Terminated employees shall have thirty (30) calendar days from the date of termination to file a complaint with the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court. * * * All untimely complaints shall be dismissed and the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court shall have no jurisdiction over the matter. (Emphasis added).
That provision reads:
All non-introductory, full-time regular employees and managers may file non-frivolous complaints related to their termination from employment with the Hoopa Valley Tribe in accordance with 1 Hoopa Valley Tribal Code § 1.1.04(f). Complaints must be filed with the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court within thirty (30) days of the date of termination. * * * The complaint shall be subject to the statute of limitations described in 2 Hoopa Valley Tribal Code § 2.3.13(b).
Under 2 HVTC § 2.3.13(b), “* * * no complaint shall be filed in an action brought pursuant to § 1.1.04(f) unless the complaint is filed within 30 days of the date of the employee’s termination.”
That provision reads:
Within five (5) calendar days following any disciplinary action or termination of employment, the employee may submit in writing to his or her immediate supervisor a summary of the reasons and any documentary evidence supporting why the said action should not have been taken against the employee. If the process does not resolve the grievance to the employee’s satisfaction, the employ may submit a written grievance to the Program manager of the immediate department for which the employee works. If the Program manager of the immediate department of which the employee works does not respond within ten (10) calendar days, the prior decision shall be deemed to be upheld. Failure of the disciplined or terminate employee to follow the specified time lines shall constitute an automatic withdrawal of the grievance. With the exception of persons who have been terminated as described in §9.3 of this Ordinance, the program manager’s decision shall be final. The employee’s submission and any supervisor responses will be kept in the employee’s file. * * *