In the Guardianship of N.S.

10 NICS App. 90, IN THE GUARDIANSHIP OF N.S. (April 2012)

IN THE MUCKLESHOOT TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS

MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN RESERVATION

AUBURN, WASHINGTON

W.P.J., III and R.J., Petitioners/Appellants,

R.S., Respondent.

No. MUC-G-06/11-118 (April 23, 2012)

SYLLABUS^*

Grandparents filed petition for guardianship of a minor child over the objections of the custodial parent. The original petition failed to address the Indian status of the youth or the parents. Trial court initially accepted jurisdiction and proceeded under code provisions governing general guardianship proceedings. An amended petition acknowledged that neither the youth, the parents, nor the sole petitioner related to the youth by blood were Indian. Upon a change of judge, and following Court of Appeals’ decision in a factually similar case, trial court found the petition alleged the youth was in need of care and dismissed the petition because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the youth. Court of Appeals holds (1) trial court initially erred by failing to follow statutory mandate to dismiss petition that did not address Indian status of the youth or parents, (2) trial court ultimately correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the non-Indian youth, (3) trial court ruled correctly that petition gave reason to believe the youth was in need of care, and (4) tribal code requires court personnel to report allegations of abuse and neglect to appropriate authorities for immediate investigation. Trial court decision dismissing petition for lack of jurisdiction affirmed, and case remanded with instructions for trial court to (1) vacate all other orders entered in the case, and (2) document compliance with statutory reporting requirements concerning youth alleged to be in need of care.

Before:	Suzanne Ojibway Townsend, Chief Judge; Leona T. Colegrove, Judge; Robert J. Miller, Judge.
Appearances:	Josh Williams and Jennifer Dixon, for Appellants.

10 NICS App. 90, IN THE GUARDIANSHIP OF N.S. (April 2012) p. 91

OPINION

This matter comes before the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Notice of Appeal filed on November 7, 2011 by W.P.J., III and R.J., a married couple, the Petitioners in the case below (hereinafter “Petitioners”).¹ Petitioners challenge the October 25, 2011 Decision on Jurisdiction of the Muckleshoot Youth Court dismissing their petition for guardianship of R.J.’s granddaughter, N.S., in case number MUC-G-06/11-118. We affirm the Youth Court’s dismissal of the petition, albeit on slightly different grounds. We remand to the trial court for the sole purposes of vacating its prior orders in this case and reporting the alleged abuse and neglect of N.S. to the appropriate authorities.

I. Basis for Court of Appeals’ Decision

A. Applicable Law

On March 23, 2012, the Muckleshoot Tribal Council adopted a substantially revised version of Title 12, formerly entitled the Muckleshoot Youth Ordinance, now entitled the Muckleshoot Child and Family Welfare Ordinance. By its own terms, the revised Title 12 “does not affect any proceeding initiated or completed upon its effective date, however, this ordinance shall apply to subsequent proceedings in the same matter or subsequent proceedings affecting the custody or placement of the same child.” MTC 12.01.110, as revised March 23, 2012. As an initial matter, this Court must determine which version of Title 12 to apply in this appeal.

“A court’s primary duty in interpreting any statute is to discern and implement the intent of the legislative body.” Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Cultee, 8 NICS App. 68, 70 (Skokomish Tribal Ct. App. 2008). Ordinarily, courts apply the plain language of a statute. See, e.g., Edmond L. v. Misti W., 9 NICS App. 118, 121 (Puyallup Tribal Ct. App. 2010); Matilton v.

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Hoopa Valley Tribe, 7 NICS App. 65, 69 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. App. 2005). However, it is a “venerable principle that statutory language should not be applied literally if doing so would produce an absurd result.” Durr v. Shineski, 638 F.3d 1342, 1349 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). See also Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 200 (1993) (a “common mandate” of statutory construction is to avoid absurd results); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 450 (1932) (construing statutes to avoid absurd results is a “traditional and appropriate function of the courts”); SEC v. Rosenthal, 650 F.3d 156, 162 (2nd Cir. 2011) (statutory interpretations that lead to absurd results are “forbidden by canons of construction”). These rules of construction are based on the respect courts owe to legislative bodies and the recognition that legislatures do not intend their statutes and ordinances to lead to absurd results.

Read literally, the language of the new ordinance means that the new ordinance applies to all existing cases except those that are either initiated or completed on the one day that the new ordinance became effective. By this interpretation, the new ordinance would however, apply to cases that had been initiated or completed well before the effective date of the new ordinance. This literal application of the revised MTC 12.01.110 leads to an absurd result. It appears to us that the intent of the drafters was to state that the new ordinance does not affect any proceeding initiated or completed prior to the effective date of the new ordinance, but substituted the word "upon" in a drafting oversight. We therefore hold that the revised ordinance does not apply to proceedings initiated or completed “prior to” its effective date. Because the Youth Court proceeding on appeal here was initiated prior to the effective date of the new ordinance, the new ordinance does not apply to that proceeding. This being the case, we apply the former version of Title 12 to our review of this matter, and all references to Title 12 in this opinion are to the former version of the Ordinance unless otherwise noted.

B. Record and Pleadings

“The Appellate Court shall decide all by majority vote cases upon the briefs, memoranda and statement [sic] filed plus the record of the trial court without oral argument unless either party requests oral argument and shows to the court that such will aid the court’s decision, or unless the Appellate Court decides on its own motion to hear oral argument.” MTC 9.03.01(h). As discussed below, the Court of Appeals is in possession of the statement filed by Petitioners with their Notice of Appeal, and Petitioners filed no other statement, memoranda or brief within the time allowed by the rules. Respondent filed no statement of any sort, and neither party has requested oral argument. We therefore base our decision on the record and the statement Petitioners filed with their Notice of Appeal.

II. Facts and Procedural History

On June 8, 2011, Petitioners filed a Petition for Guardianship in the Muckleshoot Court of Justice. The Petition was filed under the general guardianship provisions of Muckleshoot

10 NICS App. 90, IN THE GUARDIANSHIP OF N.S. (April 2012) p. 93

Tribal Code (MTC) 12A.12. On that same date, Petitioners filed a Motion for Temporary Guardianship; the affidavit of R.J.; an email copy of a notarized “Authorization of Temporary Guardianship” by which Respondent A.S. appears to have agreed to authorize Petitioner R.J. to serve as guardian for N.S. until August 1, 2011; a “To whom it may concern” letter purportedly signed by the maternal grandfather of the mother of N.S. dated June 8, 2011; and a letter addressed to the Clerk of the Court from the paternal grandmother of the mother of N.S. The petition was submitted on a form supplied by the Tribal Court. In the space provided on the form to indicate the youth’s “Tribal Status”, the word “Muckleshoot” was hand written, but then crossed out, and the space otherwise left blank. The space provided on the form to indicate the “Tribal Status” of the Youth’s mother was also left blank. The space provided on the form to indicate the “Tribal Status” of the Petitioner R.J., who is the biological mother of Respondent A.S. was also left blank. The form indicates that the “Tribal Status” of Petitioner W.P.J. III is Muckleshoot. A Family Home Study subsequently filed with the Court on July 18, 2011 establishes that Petitioner W.P.J. III married Petitioner R.J. in July of 2010 and that he is not related by blood to Respondent or N.S.

In addition to alleging that Respondent is unable to care for N.S., the petition and various other documents filed with the Youth Court on June 8, 2011, allege, among other things, that Respondent neglected to feed the child, neglected to change the child’s diaper or attend to the child’s hygiene, prohibited others from providing medical care when the child had a fever, would “frequently” “abandon” the child in the care of others, and was “verbally abusive” to the child.

The petition was initially reviewed by Judge Lawrence Numkena, who on June 9, 2011 issued an Order Appointing Temporary Guardian (ex Parte). The Order appointed Petitioners as the temporary guardians of N.S.²

On September 19, 2011, Petitioners filed, with assistance of counsel, an Amended Petition for Guardianship. The Amended Petition acknowledges that the youth N.S. is “Non-Indian;” that the mother of the youth, Respondent A.S., is “a non-Indian;” and Petitioner R.J. is “non-Indian.”

At some point, the Honorable Randy A. Doucet replaced the Honorable Judge Numkena as the presiding judge in this matter. On September 20, 2011, the Court of Appeals issued our decision in In the Guardianship of Three Indian Minors, 10 NICS App. 29 (Muckleshoot Tribal Ct. App. 2011) (as corrected by amended opinion filed October 17, 2011), wherein we ruled that if a petition for guardianship or any other filings give cause to believe that a youth is in need of care, the Muckleshoot Youth Court has no jurisdiction to hear the petition under the general

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guardianship provision of MTC 12A.12, and must instead follow the provisions for a youth in need of care proceeding set forth at MTC 12A.09.³ Although there is no documentation in the record, it appears that Judge Doucet may have requested briefing from the parties as to whether the Court of Appeals’ Opinion in In the Guardianship of Three Indian Minors precluded the Youth Court from exercising jurisdiction over Petitioners’ petition. On October 7, 201, Petitioners filed a Brief Supporting Subject Matter Jurisdiction with the Youth Court. Respondent appears to not have filed any briefing on the question of jurisdiction.

On October 25, 2011, Judge Doucet issued his Decision on Jurisdiction of the Muckleshoot Youth Court dismissing the petition for guardianship. On November 7, 2011, Petitioners filed their notice of appeal, which was accompanied by a thirteen page statement in the form of a legal brief entitled “Motion to Appeal Trial Court’s Decision on Jurisdiction Under General Guardianship Code” and certification that the notice and statement/Motion were mailed to Respondent.⁴ Petitioners filed no additional statement or brief within the thirty days provided for in the Muckleshoot Rules on Appeal, MTC 9.03.01(g). Respondent filed no brief, memorandum or statement in reply to Petitioners’ notice and statement/Motion. Neither party requested oral argument as provided for at MTC 9.03.01(h).

III. Discussion and Analysis

A. Youth Court Jurisdiction

In its Decision on Jurisdiction, the Youth Court noted that the Constitution and Bylaws of the Muckleshoot Indian Tribe provide that “[t]he Muckleshoot Indian Tribe shall have jurisdiction over all persons within the territory of the Muckleshoot Indian Reservation not excluded by federal law.” Art. I, Sec. 3.a. The Court stated

10 NICS App. 90, IN THE GUARDIANSHIP OF N.S. (April 2012) p. 95

The issue of jurisdiction arises in two ways. First, in September 2011, the Muckleshoot Tribal Court of Appeals issued its decision in the case of In the Guardianship of Three Indian Minors. The Court of Appeals held that MTC Chapter 12A.12 does not provide the Muckleshoot Youth Court with general guardianship jurisdiction in cases where the petition for guardianship or other information received by the Court alleges or otherwise gives reasons to believe that a youth is in need of care as defined by the Youth Ordinance. Second, this Court recognized while reviewing the petitions for guardianship, that 12A.12.040 required that a petition for guardianship include a statement of the specific facts which form the basis for the court’s jurisdiction.

In regards to the first potential jurisdictional defect, the Youth Court found that “[t]he facts in this case fit within the definition of a youth in need of care.” The Youth Court did not focus on the allegations in the petition and supporting documents that Respondent had directly abused N.S. by withholding food, medical care, neglecting the child’s hygiene, and periodically abandoning the child. Rather, the Youth Court focused on the more general allegations of both the original and the amended petition that Respondent lacked the resources and ability to care for N.S.⁵ and determined the allegations that Respondent was unable to fulfill parental duties, combined with the fact that no guardian had been appointed as a matter of law, brought N.S. within the definition of youth in need of care set forth at MTC 12.02.020(mm)(1) (“no parent, guardian or other custodian able, willing and available to fulfill parental duties”). The Court concluded “[b]ecause the allegations made by petitioners fit the definitions of a youth in need of care, this matter cannot proceed under the general guardianship code 12A.12.”

With regard to the second potential jurisdictional defect, the Youth Court considered MTC 12A.12.040(c), which requires a petition for guardianship to state specific facts which form the basis for the court’s jurisdiction and provides that if the petition fails to do so, the petition must be dismissed. The Court noted that although the child lives on the Muckleshoot reservation, the case “involves a non-Indian child … and her non-Indian mother,” and that the only connection to the Tribe was through the non-Indian grandmother who is married to a Muckleshoot member and lives on the reservation. The Court concluded that “[b]ecause the petitions for guardianship did not provide specific facts to form the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, or address the issue of personal jurisdiction over the parties, the petitions for guardianship should be dismissed for failure to comply with 12A.12.040(c)(3).”

Thus, while the Youth Court had already concluded that the case could not proceed as a general guardianship because the facts established that N.S. was a youth in need of care as defined by the ordinance, the dismissal of the petitions by the Youth Court is expressly based on

10 NICS App. 90, IN THE GUARDIANSHIP OF N.S. (April 2012) p. 96

Petitioners’ failure to establish the Court’s jurisdiction over N.S. and her mother as required by MTC 12A.12.040(c)(3).

Despite the clear language of the Youth Ordinance, Appellants variously claim in their statement accompanying their Notice of Appeal that the Ordinance “does not require the facts establishing the court’s jurisdiction over the parties to be included in the petition,” and even if it did, “the Petitioners did assert sufficient facts.” Appellants further contend that “the code does not require the legal basis [for jurisdiction] to be asserted – just the facts,” and “a legal basis must not be included in the Petition.” These arguments are completely without merit. Perhaps more importantly, they overlook an even more fundamental error committed by the Youth Court at the very start of these proceedings.

Along with requiring that a petition for guardianship include a “statement of the specific facts which form the basis for the petition and for the court’s jurisdiction,” MTC 12A.12.040(c)(3), the Youth Ordinance requires that a petition for guardianship must include the Indian status of the youth, MTC 12A.12.040(c)(1), and the parents MTC 12A.12.040(c)(2). The Ordinance then commands that “[i]f the petition does not contain information required by subsections (2) or (3) of this section, the petition shall be dismissed.” MTC 12A.12.040(d). As noted above, the original petition did not include the Indian status of the youth or the mother, the latter being a statutorily mandated element of the petition. Because the Petitioners failed to comply with MTC 12A.12.040(c)(2) as well as 12A.12.040(c)(3), MTC 12A.12.040(d) required that the petition be dismissed. Judge Numkena committed clear error and abused his discretion by issuing his Order Appointing Temporary Guardian (ex parte) and setting the matter for hearing.⁶ We therefore hold that the June 9, 2011 Order Appointing Temporary Guardian (ex parte) is void ab initio, and all subsequent orders of the Youth Court in this proceeding are also void.

Nothing in the Amended Petition filed by Petitioners cures the defects discussed above. The Amended Petition acknowledges that N.S., Respondent, and R.J. are all non-Indian. Although the Muckleshoot Constitution gives the Tribe “jurisdiction over all persons within the territory of the Muckleshoot Indian Reservation not excluded by federal law,” the jurisdiction of the Tribe and the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court are very different matters. The Muckleshoot Tribal Court is a statutory court, not a Constitutional court. The Muckleshoot Constitution expressly provides that the Tribal Council has the power to establish the court and define its duties and powers. Art. VI, Sec. 1.k. Thus, it is the Council, not the Constitution, that defines

10 NICS App. 90, IN THE GUARDIANSHIP OF N.S. (April 2012) p. 97

the jurisdiction of the Tribal Court. In regards to child welfare matters, the Council has expressly limited the jurisdiction of the Youth Court to:

a) Any Indian youth who resides or is domiciled within the Muckleshoot Indian Reservation; or

b) Any Muckleshoot Indian youth, notwithstanding his residence or domicile; or

c) Any youth over whom his parent, guardian or other custodian has granted custody to the Muckleshoot Youth Home.

MTC 12A.01.010.

Because the amended petition acknowledges that N.S. is non-Indian, and there is no claim that anyone had granted custody of N.S. to the Muckleshoot Youth Home (indeed, this Court takes judicial notice that the Muckleshoot Youth Home no longer exists), neither the original or amended petition included a statement of facts sufficient to form the basis for the court’s jurisdiction. The Muckleshoot Tribal Council had not given the Youth Court jurisdiction over non-Indian youth, with the exception of a narrow provision concerning youth committed to the custody to the Muckleshoot Youth Home, which was a nullity at the time the original and amended petitions were filed.⁷

Appellants argue that a consent to guardianship form signed by the mother and the mother’s failure to object to jurisdiction acted to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Respondent’s consent to guardianship was informed and made willingly, knowingly and not under duress, and that her consent was not effectively withdrawn by her actions contesting the petition throughout the proceedings, nothing in the consent form could possibly have brought N.S. within the jurisdiction of the Youth Court. N.S. is a non-Indian child and custody of N.S. had not been granted (and could not have been granted) to the Muckleshoot Youth Home.⁸ Neither the Respondent nor the Youth Court had authority to waive the jurisdictional requirements set out in Tribal code.

10 NICS App. 90, IN THE GUARDIANSHIP OF N.S. (April 2012) p. 98

B. The Youth Court’s Obligation to Report Abuse and Neglect

Except that this case involves a non-Indian youth and non-Indian parents, this case is in many regards indistinguishable from two other cases decided by the Muckleshoot Court of Appeals in the past year, those cases being In the Guardianship of Three Indian Minors, 10 NICS App. 29 (Muckleshoot Tribal Ct. App. 2011), and In the Guardianship of J.J., 10 NICS App. 12 (Muckleshoot Tribal Ct. App. 2012). Like those cases, this case involves a grandmother (and in this case her husband) who filed a petition for guardianship of a grandchild over the objections of one or both of the child’s parents. Like those cases, the petition was filed as a general guardianship proceeding under MTC Chapter 12A.12, rather than filed as a Youth in Need of Care proceeding under MTC Chapter 12A.09, even though the contents of the petition and other pleadings filed by petitioners gave “reason to believe,” as provided at MTC 12A.09.020(a), that the youth was/were in need of care as defined by MTC 12.02.020(mm). Like those cases, the Youth Court initially assumed jurisdiction over the petitions under MTC 12A.12 and ordered a home study of the petitioners pursuant to MTC 12A.12.030 and did not order an immediate investigation to determine whether the child’s welfare was at risk as required by MTC 12A.09.

In this case, the Youth Court subsequently found that N.S. was a youth in need of care based on the “failure or inability of a parent to fulfill parental duties to the extent that the youth’s physical or emotional health, safety and welfare are harmed or threatened thereby.” The Youth Ordinance expressly states that such a failure constitutes “abuse and neglect.” MTC 12.02.020(a)(4). In their Brief Supporting Subject Matter Jurisdiction filed with the Youth Court on October 7, 2011, Petitioners asserted that this case was different than In the Guardianship of Three Indian Minors, supra, because, among other things, “[t]he Petitioners have not alleged that [Respondent] neglected or abused” N.S. However, as discussed in Section II of this Opinion, the record clearly establishes that the petition and supporting documents that initiated this proceeding alleged that the Respondent abused and neglected N.S. Thus, whether construed as direct allegations of abuse, neglect and abandonment, or viewed as evidence that Respondent was failing or unable to perform parental duties, the petition and supporting documents filed in the Youth Court on June 8, 2011 clearly gave “reason to believe” that N.S. was in need of care, as defined by MTC 12.02.020(mm).

As this Court stated in In the Guardianship of Three Indian Minors, supra:

The Youth Ordinance is absolutely clear that “Any person having reason to believe that a youth is in need of care, as defined in this title, shall immediately report the matter to the tribal law enforcement department, the Youth Home

10 NICS App. 90, IN THE GUARDIANSHIP OF N.S. (April 2012) p. 99

Director, or a Youth Caseworker.” MTC 12A.09.020(a) (emphases added). A report of abuse or neglect then triggers the statutory duties and powers of the specified Tribal authorities to “immediately” investigate the allegations and take action to protect the youth if needed pursuant to MTC 12A.09.030, et seq. Thus, where there is a reason to believe that a child has been abused or neglected, it must be reported to the specified authorities.

The language of 12A.09.020 does not limit or restrict who is to report the matter to the proper authorities - the code supplies the broad term of “any person” without any modifier and without further definition. Reading MTC 12A.09.020 in concert with MTC 12.01.010, which states the purpose of the Youth Ordinance, 12A.09.020 requires any person, including court personnel, as well as actual or potential petitioners, to report the matter to the proper authorities.

In the Guardianship of Three Indian Minors, 10 NICS App. at 34.

Moreover, the reporting requirements of the former version of the Youth Ordinance were not limited to youth alleged to be in need of care. The former, applicable version of the Youth Ordinance expressly required the court clerk to “immediately notify the Youth Home Director in writing of any action begun in Youth Court by someone other than the Tribe. MTC12A.09.010(c) (emphases added).” In the Guardianship of J.J., 10 NICS App. at 76. Technically, it would have been impossible for the clerk to strictly comply with this requirement because the exact position of Youth Home Director did not exist. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Ordinance placed a heavy emphasis on notifying Tribal youth workers and law enforcement personnel of any court action that raised the possibility that a youth on the reservation was at risk. The statutory requirements for immediate reporting and investigation ensure “that a youth who is being abused or neglected receives protection as soon as possible rather than allowing the abuse and neglect to continue. The requirement for an immediate investigation also provides good parents protection against baseless allegations.” In the Guardianship of Three Indian Minors, 10 NICS App. at 35.

Unlike the Youth Court’s jurisdiction, which as noted above generally extends only to Indian youth, the reporting and investigation requirements of MTC 12A.09 extend to any “youth,” which the Ordinance defines as “any unmarried person under the age of eighteen (18) years not otherwise emancipated.” MTC 12.02.020(hh). Thus, it is clear from the Youth Ordinance and from our prior decisions that the Youth Court personnel had a duty to immediately report Petitioners’ allegations to the appropriate authorities.

The March 23, 2012 revision to the Youth Ordinance, now designated the Child and Family Welfare Ordinance, is equally clear on this point. “It is the policy of the Muckleshoot Tribe to encourage every person residing or working within the Reservation who has reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been abused, neglected, or otherwise is a youth in need of care

10 NICS App. 90, IN THE GUARDIANSHIP OF N.S. (April 2012) p. 100

as defined in this title, to report the suspected abuse or neglect to MCFS [Muckleshoot Child and Family Services], or to CPS [Washington State Child Protective Services] under applicable agreements, or to Tribal law enforcement as agencies who will ensure that such matters are appropriately investigated.” MTC 12.04.010, March 23, 2012 Revision (emphasis added). Muckleshoot judges and court personnel are not included within the list of required reporters set forth in the new Ordinance at MTC 12.04.020. However, the new ordinance expressly provides “[a]llegations of child abuse or neglect not previously investigated by MCFS that are brought forward in testimony in any Court proceeding to determine custody, visitation, placement or emancipation of a child, shall be considered a report of child abuse, and such proceeding shall be stayed while the allegations are forwarded for investigation ….” MTC 12.04.080, March 23, 2012 Revision. Thus, Muckleshoot judges and court personnel continue to have a duty under the revised ordinance to refer allegations of abuse and neglect to appropriate authorities for investigation. As with the former version of Title 12, the reporting requirements of the revised ordinance apply to any youth, not just Muckleshoot or Indian youth.

IV. Conclusion and Order

The Youth Court erred by failing to comply with the statutory provision requiring dismissal of the petition based on the defects in the petition. The Youth Court also erred if it failed to comply with the statutory requirements for reporting the allegations set forth in the petition to appropriate authorities for immediate investigation.

We affirm the decision of the Youth Court to dismiss both the original and amended petitions for lack of jurisdiction. The failure of the original petition to address the Tribal status of the youth or either of the youth’s parents; the failure of either of the petitions to set forth specific facts establishing the basis for the court’s jurisdiction; and ultimately the fact that this proceeding involves a youth over whom the Tribal Council has not granted the Youth Court jurisdiction, all require dismissal.

We remand this matter to the Muckleshoot Court of Justice⁹ for the sole purposes of (1) vacating all orders of the Youth Court in this proceeding except the Court’s October 25, 2011 Decision on Jurisdiction; and (2) reporting this matter to appropriate Tribal or State of Washington personnel if it has not already done so. No later than five business days after this Opinion is filed with the court clerk, the presiding judge shall inform the Court of Appeals in writing as to how the Court of Justice has complied with its duties to report the allegations of abuse and neglect brought forward in the proceedings below.

The syllabus is not a part of the Court’s Opinion. The syllabus is a summary of the Opinion prepared by the publishers of this reporter only for the convenience of the reader. Therefore, the syllabus should not be cited in whole or part as legal authority. Only the Opinion, which follows the syllabus, may be cited as legal authority.

Former Chapter 12.07 of the Muckleshoot Youth Ordinance, which we hold in Section I of this opinion is applicable, requires confidentiality in Youth Court proceedings, and section 12.07.020 expressly prohibits the release of “judgments” or the publication of “identifying information concerning any youth, parent, guardian, or other custodian or person appearing as a witness in a proceeding held pursuant to this title … unless for good cause shown it is specifically permitted by order of the Court.” The ordinance further states “no person shall disclose any identifying information concerning a matter conducted pursuant to this title,” directs the Youth Court Judge and Judicial Officer to warn those in attendance to observe the confidentiality provisions, and provides for civil penalties for those in violation of the confidentiality provisions. Id. The Court of Appeals concludes that the need for future litigants and the Muckleshoot Tribe to know of the substance of this ruling and to be able to follow its precedent provides good cause to publish this Opinion in the official reports of the Tribe’s Appellate Court decisions. The March 23, 2012 revision of Title 12 also provides for publication of appellate opinions so long as the child’s name and other identifying information is removed. MTC 12A.01.080(g) revised. Thus, in order to further the objectives of former MTC 12.07.020 and the current MTC 12A.01.080(g), this Opinion will use only the initials of any youth, parent, custodian, or witness referenced in this Opinion. The parties are hereby reminded of their independent obligation to maintain the confidentiality of these proceedings as provided for in MTC 12.07.020.

The June 9, 2011 Order set the matter for hearing on August 9, 2011. For reasons not evident from the trial court file, there was no hearing on August 9, and instead on August 10 the court issued a notice setting “trial” for September 27, 2011. The trial court file has no record of a hearing or trial having occurred on September 27, but the court’s Decision on Jurisdiction indicates that the matter was ultimately heard on October 11, 2011.

On October 17, 2011, this Court issued a “corrected” version of its Opinion in In the Guardianship of Three Indian Minors, 10 NICS App. 29 (Muckleshoot Tribal Ct. App. 2011).

The Muckleshoot Rules on Appeal require a notice of appeal to be filed within ten days after entry of a final order. MTC 9.03.01(a). Here, the Notice of Appeal was filed thirteen calendar days after the Youth Court’s Decision was filed. However, the Decision by its own terms states that it would not become “final” until fourteen days from the date of “filing.” There is nothing in the Muckleshoot rules or the Youth Ordinance that provides for the filing or entry of an order that is not final, and this Court notes that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that trial courts have no authority to extend statutory deadlines for the filing of notices of appeal. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007). There is also nothing in the Muckleshoot Rules that establishes whether “days” means calendar days or business days, and neither “entry” nor “final” are defined. In addition, it does not appear that the clerk maintained a docket for this case or any sort of judgment docket for the court in general, nor does the record include a formal certification of service establishing how and when the Decision was provided to each of the parties. While we find nothing granting the trial court authority to extend the statutory deadline for appeal, and while entry of an order that is not final would appear to be a legal non sequitur, because there is no definition of these terms in the code and no docket or certification of service to establish when the Decision was entered, there is no basis for the Court of Appeals to determine that the Petitioners’ Notice of Appeal was not timely filed in this case.

Petitioners continue to make these allegations in the statement accompanying their Notice of Appeal, where they assert that Respondent “does not have stable employment, does not have stable housing, is living without electricity, and generally cannot provide for N.S.”

Judge Numkena compounded this error by failing to “make a determination of the youth’s Indian status” at “the first proceeding or hearing involving a youth” as required by MTC 12A.01.050(1). The remainder of section MTC 12A.01.050 establishes procedures for determining the youth’s Indian status if not known, and for notifying any other tribe of which the youth might be a member or might otherwise have interests in the proceedings. The clear implication is that if the youth is determined to not be Indian, the Court has no jurisdiction and if any notice should be given, it should be given to appropriate state authorities.

The March 23, 2012 revision of Title 12, Section 12.03.010 similarly limits the jurisdiction of the tribal court to

(a) An Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the Muckleshoot Indian Reservation; or

(b) A Muckleshoot Indian child, notwithstanding his/her residence, although jurisdiction may be concurrent with another jurisdiction; or

(c) A Muckleshoot descendant child, or a non Indian adopted child of a Muckleshoot enrolled parent, where both parents and the guardian, if any, of such child, have consented in writing to the jurisdiction of the Muckleshoot Indian Tribe in an action under this title.

“Muckleshoot descendant child” is defined as “the biological child of an enrolled member of the Muckleshoot Tribe, where the child is not eligible for enrollment, but resides on or near the Muckleshoot Reservation.” MTC 12.02.010, as revised March 23, 2012. Thus, the Tribal Council continues to deny the Tribal Court jurisdiction over a non-Indian child such as N.S.

Neither could the Youth Court exercise jurisdiction over N.S. under the March 23, 2012 revision to Title 12, even with the consent of Respondent, because N.S. is not an Indian child, not a Muckleshoot Indian child, not a Muckleshoot descendant child, and not a non Indian adopted child of a Muckleshoot enrolled parent. See footnote 7, supra.

The revised Title 12 abandons the designation of “Youth Court” and instead designates the Muckleshoot Court of Justice as the trial court for all matters under the revised Ordinance. See, e.g., MTC 12.03.010, March 23, 2012 Revision.