20 NICS App. 16, IN RE WELFARE OF L.C. (August 2022)
IN THE MUCKLESHOOT TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS
MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN RESERVATION
AUBURN, WASHINGTON
In re welfare of L.C.
A.M., Appellant,
v.
Muckleshoot Child and Family Services, Appellee.
NO. MUC-AP-05/22-092 (August 8, 2022)
SYLLABUS*
Trial court ordered child in out-of-state care pending appeal. Appellants filed motion to stay this order. Court of Appeals denied motion to stay and ruled manifest injustice would result if stay granted.
Before: |
Gregory M. Silverman, Chief Judge; Jerry R. Ford, Associate Judge; Thomas Weather, Associate Judge. |
Appearances: |
Brianna Johnston-Hanks, for Appellant mother and Stacey Lara, for Appellant Youth; Matthew Covello, for Appellee MCFS. |
OPINION
Per Curiam:
BEFORE THE COURT is the motion (and refiled motion) of the youth, L.C., and her mother, A.M., to stay the order of the trial court to place the child in out-of-state care pending this appeal. After careful consideration, the Court hereby DENIES the motion.
Generally, under Muckleshoot tribal law, this Court must enter a stay of the trial court order unless “manifest justice” would result:
In any case in which an appeal is perfected as required herein, the appellant may petition the Court of Appeals for an order staying the order, commitment, or judgment rendered, conditioned upon execution of a bond to guarantee performance of the judgment, order, or
20 NICS App. 16, IN RE WELFARE OF L.C. (August 2022) p. 17
commitment. A stay shall be granted in all cases in which it is requested unless manifest injustice would result therefrom.
Muckleshoot Tribal Code § 3.02.060(e). Black's Law Dictionary defines the phrase “manifest injustice” to mean: “An error in the trial court that is direct, obvious, and observable, such as a defendant's guilty plea that is involuntary or that is based on a plea agreement that the prosecution rescinds.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 982 (8th ed.2004). Courts tend to define “manifest injustice” as a serious transgression of an appellant’s rights or a result that is shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable. See State v. Little, 188 N.E.3d 1116 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022); Thuko v. State, 444 P.3d 927 (Kan. 2019); Iraola-Lovaco v. Commonwealth, 586 S.W.3d 241 (Ky. 2019); In re Beiter, 590 B.R. 446 (S.D. Ohio 2018); Commonwealth v. Jabbie, 200 A.3d 500 (Pa. Superior Ct. 2018); Earl v. Puyallup Tribe, 11 NICS 73 (2013); In re Welfare of M.K., 805 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011); In the Membership of Julie Bill Meza, Et Al., 7 NICS App. 111 (2006).
Given the above, it is clear that the standard of manifest injustice was developed primarily in criminal and civil tort cases involving adults and not in juvenile dependency cases where the best interests of the child is the usual standard guiding a court’s decision. Indeed, given the actual language of Section 3.02.060(e), it is doubtful that the drafters of this provision considered its possible application in juvenile dependency cases while developing it. For example, the statutory language requires a stay absent manifest injustice “upon execution of a bond to guarantee performance of the judgment, order, or commitment.” Juvenile dependency matters have no monetary judgment, order, or commitment that would require a bond. This statutory language was clearly written with the typical civil tort case in mind, not a child welfare matter.
Nonetheless, section 12A.03.120 of Title 12A, Civil Proceedings: Child and Family Welfare, states that “Family Protection Orders constitute final order for purposes of appeal” and section 12A.03.170 provides that “[a]ppeals from Permanent Plan Orders under this title are available to parties pursuant to Section 3.02.” Accordingly, this Court cannot avoid confronting the question of how to apply the standard of manifest injustice in juvenile dependency cases.
The answer to this question is provided by the overriding and fundamental policy that informs Title 12A, articulating the Tribe’s commitment to protecting the children of the Tribe and always acting in their best interests. Section 12A.01.010, Policy, of Title 12A, requires that “[t]he Court, consistent with the evidence presented and the safety and best interests of the child, maintain a goal of sustaining and reuniting families.” (emphasis added). Pursuant to this policy, it is clear that this Court of Appeals when hearing an appeal authorized by Title 12A must always proceed in a manner that is consistent with the evidence presented and the safety and best interests of the child. In particular, when deciding whether to grant a requested stay of a lower court order in a juvenile dependency case pursuant to section 3.02.060(e), this Court’s decision must promote the safety and best interests of the minor child based on the record before it.
In light of the foregoing, when applied in a juvenile dependency case, the standard of manifest injustice in section 3.02.060(e) must be understood to mean that a stay should not be granted if, on the record before the court, that stay would not be in the best interests of the minor child and would threaten the child’s safety. Moreover, resonating with the standard’s meaning
20 NICS App. 16, IN RE WELFARE OF L.C. (August 2022) p. 18
when applied in the typical civil or criminal case involving adults, we must acknowledge that for a court to grant a stay in a juvenile dependency matter when that stay was not in the best interests of the child and would threaten that child’s safety would indeed be “shocking and jurisprudentially intolerable.”
Accordingly, after a careful consideration of the record before us, we find that it is in the best interests of the minor to remain in her current out-of-state placement pending resolution of this appeal, that returning her to her prior placement would threaten her safety, and, therefore, that granting the requested stay would result in a manifest injustice therefrom. Based on these findings, the request to stay the out-of-state placement order must be denied.
The syllabus is not a part of the Court’s Opinion. The syllabus is a summary of the Opinion prepared by the publishers of this reporter only for the convenience of the reader. Therefore, the syllabus should not be cited in whole or part as legal authority. Only the Opinion, which follows the syllabus, may be cited as legal authority.