2 NICS App. 127, Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe v. Bolstrom and Hepfer (June 1991)
IN THE LOWER ELWHA KLALLAM TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS
LOWER ELWHA KLALLAM INDIAN RESERVATION
PORT ANGELES, WASHINGTON
Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe v. James L. Bolstrom and Russell N. Hepfer
Nos. LOW-CRF-l/91-053, 054 (June 19, 1991)
SUMMARY
Two members of the Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe were charged with violating tribal fishing regulations by utilizing drift net fishing methods on the Elwha River. When arrested by the tribal fisheries enforcement officer, the defendants were not informed of their rights under Miranda v. Arizona, as required under Section 40.20 of the Tribal Fishing Ordinance. The defendants made no incriminating statements and were advised of their rights after being transported to jail. During their trial, the defendants, who represented themselves without assistance of counsel, moved to dismiss charges against them on the grounds that the enforcement officer failed to inform them of their Miranda rights.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The Tribe appealed, arguing (1) that the trial court erred in allowing the defendants to move for dismissal once the trial had begun and (2) that dismissal of charges is not the proper remedy for an officer's failure to inform a defendant of his or her Miranda rights. Finding that Rule “O” of the Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe's Court Procedures Code gives a trial judge broad discretion as to when motions can be raised, especially in respect to pro se defendants, the Tribal Appeals Court held that no procedural error occurred in the granting of the motion. Nonetheless, the Court reversed the trial court's order of dismissal, holding that sanctions for failure to advise defendants of their Miranda rights properly take the form of suppression of evidence under the exclusionary rule, not dismissal of criminal charges.
FULL TEXT
2 NICS App. 127, Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe v. Bolstrom and Hepfer (June 1991) p. 128
OPINION AND ORDER
PER CURIAM:
This appeal presents two issues for review. First, should the trial court have allowed the defendants to make their motion for dismissal after the trial had begun? Secondly, is dismissal of criminal charges the proper remedy for an officer's failure to advise a defendant of his Miranda rights?
FACTS
Both defendants are enrolled members of the Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe. On December 22, 1990, at approximately 7:40 in the morning, Fisheries Enforcement Officer Zeller observed the defendants drift net fishing on the Elwha River. Tribal fishing regulations in effect at this time only allowed for fishing by set nets and hook and line fishing. Officer Zeller requested other officers and arrested the defendants a short time later. Both defendants were transported to jail, where they were advised of their Miranda rights. Neither defendant made any incriminating statements. From the time of arrest to the advisement of rights, approximately one hour had elapsed.
On March 1, 1991, this matter came for trial before the Tribal Court. Each defendant had been charged with one count of fishing by an unlawful method. During cross examination of Officer Zeller, the defendants moved to dismiss the charges against them under Rule “O” of the Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe's Court Procedures Code. The defendants alleged that the officer violated Section 40.20 of the Tribal Fishing Ordinance by not immediately informing them of their rights, and that, therefore, the charges should be dismissed. The trial court agreed with the defendants and dismissed the charges. The Tribe appeals.
CONCLUSION
The Tribal Appeals Court, having heard the oral arguments of the parties, having read all court documents and reviewed other documents pertinent to the case, and having considered all exhibits introduced into evidence, now makes the following conclusions.
The appellate court finds that the evidence does not support the Tribe's assertion that the trial court committed error in entertaining the defendants' motion after the trial had started. Rule “O” allows the trial court discretion as to when motions can be raised. The defendants are both laymen and were without the assistance of legal counsel and should be afforded wider latitude by the court. The trial court's failure to apply strict procedural time limits so as to bar the defendants' motion for dismissal was not error.
2 NICS App. 127, Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe v. Bolstrom and Hepfer (June 1991) p. 129
The appellate court finds, however, that the trial court did err when it granted the motion for dismissal based on the officer's failure to advise the defendants of their rights immediately after their arrest. Section 40.20 of the Fishing Ordinance is essentially a statutory listing of the decision of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda decision provides that prior to any questioning of a person in custody, he must be advised that he has the right to remain silent and that any statements made can and will be used as evidence against him. Failure to advise a defendant will generally bring sanctions by the court. These sanctions are in the form of the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is used to suppress any evidence that is gained prior to the defendants having been given their rights.
The Tribal Appeals Court agrees with the Tribe that the purpose of Section 40.20 is to adopt the policy of Miranda. This being a case of first impression, there is no Lower Elwha Klallam statutory or case law prescribing a remedy for failing to give Miranda warnings in a timely fashion. However, this court finds that the exclusionary rule conforms to the spirit of fundamental fairness inherent in Lower Elwha Klallam law. Neither of the defendants in this case made any statements to the officer and were therefore not harmed by the officer's failure to advise. If they had made incriminating statements, then those statements would not have been allowed as evidence.
Dismissal of criminal charges should only be used when the defendants' rights have been so prejudiced that their right to a fair trial is materially affected. See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981) and United States v. Colbert, 474 F. 2d 174 (9th Cir. 1973). There has been no evidence in this case that the rights of the defendants have been prejudiced, and therefore dismissal of the charges was inappropriate.
ORDER
It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows:
1. The trial court's order of dismissal is reversed.
2. This case is remanded to the trial court to continue the trial.
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3. |
The defendants are ordered to appear before the trial court on the twenty-first day of June, 1991, at 10:00 a.m. |
4. Costs will not be awarded to either party.