2 NICS App. 170, Decoteau v. Ives (August 1992)
IN THE PORT GAMBLE S'KLALLAM TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS
PORT GAMBLE S'KLALLAM INDIAN RESERVATION
PORT GAMBLE, WASHINGTON
Deborah Decoteau v. James Ives, Jr.
No. POR-CI-5/91-76 (August 3, 1992)
SUMMARY
Accusing the defendant of driving off with her car and damaging it, the plaintiff brought suit for damages. After hearing testimony from both sides, the trial court dismissed the case on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had done the damage.
"In the interests of justice," the Court of Appeals remanded the case so that additional evidence could be presented before the trial court. Noting that both plaintiff and defendant had represented themselves at trial, the appellate panel found that neither party had done an adequate job of presenting the testimony of their witnesses. It was apparent from the record, the panel observed, that there was potentially important evidence which had not been presented at trial. But Port Gamble S'Klallam court rules did not allow additional evidence to be taken on appeal.
In refusing to grant the plaintiff's request that the testimony of one defense witness be stricken on grounds that the witness was the defendant's wife (and therefore biased), the court pointed out that all relevant evidence is admissible in the Port Gamble S'Klallam Community Court unless its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, or unless it is otherwise inadmissible under Port Gamble S'Klallam law. The claim that a witness may be biased, observed the court, relates to the credibility of that witness's testimony, not to its relevance.
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Appellant Deborah Decoteau and respondent James Ives, Jr., both appeared pro se. |
2 NICS App. 170, Decoteau v. Ives (August 1992) p. 171
DECISION ON APPEAL
HOSTNIK, Associate Justice:
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 3, 1991, the parties traveled together in plaintiff's 1982 Chevrolet Camaro to a party at a friend's house. The plaintiff stopped her vehicle and went into the house, leaving the defendant in the passenger seat of the vehicle, and her keys in the ignition. When the plaintiff came out of the house, the vehicle and the defendant were both gone.
The plaintiff later located her vehicle abandoned, and found the right front quarter panel was damaged. The damage was estimated at more than $1,000.
On the night of the party both plaintiff and defendant had been drinking. The defendant admitted that he had been drinking, that he was present at the location of the party, that he was seated in the passenger seat of the automobile at the time the plaintiff left the vehicle to enter the house, and that he was not at the house when the plaintiff returned. But there was no direct evidence showing that the defendant drove the vehicle from the site of the party, or that he was responsible for damaging it.
Six witnesses testified at the time of trial. In addition, several exhibits were admitted into evidence. However, after hearing all of the evidence and testimony, the trial judge determined that the plaintiff had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the damage to her automobile. Therefore, the court issued an order of dismissal finding that the defendant "does not owe repair damages to the plaintiff...on the conclusion that there is not enough [evidence] to show by preponderance that the defendant actually did the damage." That order was entered on March 17, 1992.
II. MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY
On appeal, the plaintiff asked this court to strike the testimony of Ramona Bayhylle on the basis that she is the wife of the defendant, and was therefore biased to testify in favor of her husband. Plaintiff asserts no other basis upon which to strike the testimony of this witness.
In analyzing this issue we recognize that precedents from other courts are not binding upon us, but can be used as a guide. We look first to decisions from other tribal courts, then to federal cases, and thereafter to state decisions. This is particularly appropriate in cases of first impression before this court.
In most systems of justice, claims that a witness may be biased are considered by the court in determining how much weight to give that particular witness's testimony--not in determining whether that testimony shall be admitted. It is up to the trial judge to determine the credibility of
2 NICS App. 170, Decoteau v. Ives (August 1992) p. 172
witnesses. United States v. Eberhardt, 12 Indian L. Rep. 6022 (1985); United States v. Hendrix, 11 Indian L. Rep. 6047 (1984). It is possible to admit testimony, but to afford it little or no weight in reaching a final decision. This is especially true in the tribal system of justice, which prefers to admit all relevant evidence, and to then let the trial court determine the credibility of that evidence.
A determination regarding relevancy of evidence is a matter of discretion with the trial court, which generally is not reversed, except upon a showing of manifest abuse of discretion. A manifest abuse of discretion occurs only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 82 S. Ct. 1119, 8 L. Ed.2d 313 (1962), reh. denied, 370 U.S. 965, 82 S. Ct. 1578, 8 L. Ed.2d 834 (1962); Delno v. Market Street Railway Co., 124 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1942).
The Port Gamble S'Klallam Law and Order Code states that all relevant evidence shall be admissible in civil proceedings, except when the court finds that its prejudicial value outweighs its probative value, or when otherwise inadmissible under Port Gamble S'Klallam law. Port Gamble S'Klallam Law and Order Code, Section 3.6.4. The plaintiff has not provided any authority in support of her claim that the testimony of Ramona Bayhylle was inadmissible under Port Gamble S'Klallam law. Therefore, in order to decide this motion, the court must decide whether the prejudicial value of this testimony outweighs its probative value.
The testimony of Ms. Bayhylle did have probative value. It was not directly relevant to the issues, but did have a degree of circumstantial relevance. The testimony did not have any prejudicial effect. It merely attempted to counter the evidence admitted by the plaintiff. Simply because the testimony came from the defendant's wife, or because it was at odds with the plaintiffs evidence, does not make the testimony prejudicial in effect.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals finds that there is no basis presented for excluding the testimony of Ramona Bayhylle. The motion to strike that testimony is therefore denied. That testimony was properly admitted as part of the evidence in this case.
III. STATUS OF THE EVIDENCE
There is no dispute that the defendant was seated in the plaintiff’s vehicle when she left to enter the house of the party. There is also no dispute that when the plaintiff returned, both the defendant and the vehicle were missing. When the vehicle was located some time later, it had been abandoned and damaged. There is no dispute that the amount of the damage exceeded $1,000.
There is also no dispute that no one saw the defendant leave the site of the party driving plaintiff's vehicle, or that anyone saw defendant cause damage to the vehicle. Plaintiffs claim that the defendant damaged her car is
2 NICS App. 170, Decoteau v. Ives (August 1992) p. 173
countered by defendant's claim that he left the site of the party on foot, leaving the car at the party.
However, there are several troubling issues raised by the record. For instance, the defendant gave two different reasons as to why he left the location of the party. At one point he stated that there were drugs and alcohol involved at the party, and that was the reason he left. Record at 14, lines 17-19. But a few minutes later he testified that he didn't know anyone at the party, so that was the reason he left. Record at 15, lines 5-7.
There is also a discrepancy as to the period of time that the plaintiff was in the house at the party. At one point in her testimony she indicated that she was only in the house for a matter of minutes, Record at 27, lines 12-13, but she also testified that the time frame was closer to an hour and a half. Record at 27, line 14.
After the night of the party, the defendant gave the plaintiff $100 to help pay for the damage to her car. The plaintiff testified that this was meant to be an initial payment, and that the defendant had agreed to make additional payments to pay for the damage. Record at 7, lines 16-25. The defendant's testimony, on the other hand, was that the $100 was given simply to help out the plaintiff because they were friends. Record at 8, lines 10-15. At a later time, the defendant requested that the $100 be returned to him so he could use that money to pay for parts to repair plaintiff's vehicle. Record at 9, lines 18-20. However, the parts were never obtained, and the vehicle has not been repaired.
Neither party was represented at trial by an attorney or spokesperson. In addition to the plaintiff herself, three other witnesses testified for the plaintiff, and three witnesses (including the defendant) testified for the defense. Neither party did an adequate job of presenting the testimony of their witnesses. Therefore, the trial judge was placed in the difficult position of attempting to extract evidence by questioning witnesses.
The role of the trial judge is to hear the evidence, and render a decision based on that evidence. It is the responsibility of the parties to present the evidence which supports their case. However, when parties are unrepresented, the court recognizes that they may be unfamiliar with what facts are relevant to their claims, or the manner in which to question witnesses and present evidence to the trial court. Frequently, many important questions go unanswered unless they are asked by the trial judge. This places a trial judge in a difficult position of attempting to make an informed decision, but having to examine witnesses to extract the evidence necessary to render a fair decision. The question becomes how far should a trial judge go in extracting evidence.
The trial judge in this case did a remarkable job of attempting to walk this fine line. However, it is apparent from the state of the trial court record and from the arguments advanced on appeal that there is additional evidence
2 NICS App. 170, Decoteau v. Ives (August 1992) p. 174
which was not presented by the parties at trial that may be important in order to fully explore the claims and defenses of the parties.
Generally, in a civil case a plaintiff must prove his or her case by a preponderance of the evidence. This is true in both tribal and non-tribal systems of justice. Chippewa-Ottawa Tribes v. Sebastian, 17 Indian L. Rep. 6119, 6121 (1990); Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee v. Insurance Co. of North America, 551 F. Supp. 1239 (1982). If a party fails to meet that burden of proof, judgment must be rendered against him or her. Such decisions are reviewed on appeal to determine whether the trial court in rendering its decision committed a manifest abuse of discretion. Cassino v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047, 108 S. Ct. 785,98 L. Ed.2d 870 (1988). If no manifest abuse is found, the trial court's decision is affirmed.
In the Port Gamble S'Klallam system of justice, the civil standard of proof is the same as the general standard. The Port Gamble S'Klallam Law and Order Code provides that the party asking for judgment "shall have the burden of proving all elements of his or her case by the greater weight of the evidence." Port Gamble S'Klallam Law and Order Code, Section 3.6.3. However, the Port Gamble system also requires this appellate court not to look narrowly at what occurred at trial, but to have a broader perspective. Thus Section 7.8.1 of the Code states:
The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or modify the Community Court decision being reviewed and take other action as the merits of the case and the interest of justice may require.
This court is firmly convinced that the interests of justice require this case to be remanded to the trial court to allow both parties an opportunity to present additional evidence in support of their respective cases. In oral argument upon appeal, both parties attempted to present additional facts not in the record which they felt were important to their side of this story. Additional evidence cannot be taken on appeal. The record before the appellate court consists only of a transcript or statement of the trial court proceedings. See Port Gamble S'Klallam Law and Order Code, Sections 7.7.4, 7.7.6.
In passing, we note that this matter could have been reconsidered by the trial judge if requested by a party. A new hearing or reconsideration may be granted if the original judgment was based on or reached as a result of fraud or mistake, or if there is new information available which could have affected the outcome of the case, and which could not have been discovered in time for the original hearing. See Port Gamble S'Klallam Law and Order Code, Section 3.7.4. If that procedure had been utilized in this case, this appeal may not have been necessary. Reconsideration is a procedure available to the parties to attempt to get the matter resolved at the trial level before exercising a right to appeal.
2 NICS App. 170, Decoteau v. Ives (August 1992) p. 175
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, this matter is remanded to the trial court to allow both parties an opportunity to present additional evidence in support of their positions. The parties are free to have an attorney or spokesperson represent them at that hearing, if they so desire.
COOCHISE, Chief Justice, and EDWARDS, Associate Justice, concur.