4 NICS App. 73, PAUL v. TAYLOR (February 1996)

IN THE TULALIP TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS

    TULALIP INDIAN RESERVATION

    MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON

    Stormmy Paul, Appellant/Plaintiff

     v.

George Taylor, George Williams, Raymond Moses, Loretta Contraro, Nonie Cooper, Vickie Jablonski, Helen Fenrich, Caroline Thornberry, Dawn Simpson, Marie Zackuse, Calvin Taylor, Donna Muir, Sheryl Fryberg, and Virginia Carpenter, Respondents/Defendants

    No. TUL-Ci-4/95-361 (February 23, 1996)

SUMMARY

Trial court dismissed without prejudice Appellant’s defamation action “for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.” We reverse and remand.

FULL TEXT

Before:            Elbridge Coochise, Chief Justice; Charles R. Hostnik, Justice; Yvonne M. Leveque, Justice.

Appearances:  Don Morrison, counsel for Appellant Stormmy Paul; Douglas Bell, counsel for named Respondents.

Per Curiam:

This matter came before the Tulalip Tribal Court of Appeals on February 12, 1996, pursuant to Appellant’s Notice of Appeal filed on October 5, 1995. Appellant Stormmy Paul appeals from the Tulalip Tribal Court’s dismissal of his defamation action without prejudice “for failure to exhaust administrative remedies”.

Both parties agree that Mr. Paul is an enrolled member of the Tulalip Tribes; therefore, the issue of Mr. Paul’s enrollment status is moot. Remanding this case to the Tribe’s Board of Directors as ordered by the trial court would have no effect; there is no controversy for the Board of Directors to resolve.

This case is an action based in tort, the merits of which have not yet been addressed. This case should be permitted to proceed in trial court to address the many issues raised by the Complaint.

4 NICS App. 73, PAUL v. TAYLOR (February 1996) p. 74

Appellant is an enrolled member of the Tulalip Tribes and resides within the boundaries of the Tulalip Indian Reservation. Respondents are enrolled members of the Tulalip Tribes. The alleged defamatory action took place within the exterior boundaries of the Tulalip Indian Reservation. Therefore, personal and territorial jurisdiction exist.

The sole issue on appeal before this Court is whether the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of Mr. Paul’s complaint was proper. The merits of Mr. Paul’s defamation complaint have not been addressed by the trial court; therefore, the facts relating to that action are not before us and do not assist us in determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. Nevertheless, if the trial court determines that subject matter jurisdiction exists, the litigants in this matter should be allowed an opportunity to fully develop the record.

Therefore, based on the foregoing,

It is hereby ordered that the trial court’s Order Dismissing Mr. Paul’s defamation action without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is reversed;

It is further ordered that this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.