MIC v. LANG

4 NICS App. 86, MIC v. LANG (July 1996)

IN THE METLAKATLA TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS

METLAKATLA INDIAN COMMUNITY

METLAKATLA, ALASKA

Metlakatla Indian Community, Respondent

Thomas E. Lang, Appellant

No. 96-07, 96-08, 96-83 (July 25, 1996)

SUMMARY

Appellant was charged with liquor possession and resisting arrest. When Appellant failed to appear for trial, the Magistrate’s Court found him guilty by default and issued an arrest warrant. Appellant appeared that same day for a hearing on the warrant and pled “not guilty”. The court entered a “no contest” plea, found Appellant guilty of disobedience to a lawful court order, and imposed a fine.

We reverse and remand for a hearing on the merits of the liquor possession and resisting arrest charges. We vacate the judgment and sentence for disobedience to a lawful order of the court.

FULL TEXT

Before: Elbridge Coochise, Chief Justice; Dennis L. Nelson, Justice; John L. Roe, Justice.

Appearances: Thomas E. Lang, pro se appellant; Sol Atkinson, for the Metlakatla Indian Community.

This matter came before the Metlakatla Tribal Court of Appeals pursuant to Appellant’s Notice of Appeal filed on January 19, 1996. Appellant appeals the Magistrate’s Court entry on January 18, 1996 of a default judgment finding him guilty of liquor possession and resisting lawful arrest, in violation of §§ 52 and 17, respectively, of the Code of Criminal Offenses. Appellant also appeals the January 18, 1996 Magistrate’s Court finding that he was guilty of failing to appear for trial on liquor possession and resisting arrest charges.

On July 17, 1996, the parties were notified that this Court would hear this appeal on July 18, 1996 if the parties so desired. Appellant, having been fully advised, knowingly and voluntarily waived the notice requirement and agreed to proceed with oral argument on July 18, 1996. Respondent raised no objection. Notice was thereby waived by both parties.

4 NICS App. 86, MIC v. LANG (July 1996) p. 87

I. JURISDICTION

This Court has personal jurisdiction over Appellant because he is a member of the Metlakatla Indian Community. The act which is the subject of this appeal occurred within the exterior boundaries of the Metlakatla Indian Reservation, giving rise to territorial jurisdiction. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Ordinance 653, § 1 (Code of Criminal Offenses, Ordinance Relating to Law and Order), and Article V of the Metlakatla Constitution.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

The issues on appeal are as follows:

(1) Did the Magistrate’s Court err in entering a finding of guilt by default in a criminal proceeding against Mr. Lang when he failed to appear for trial on charges of resisting arrest and liquor possession?

(2) Did the Magistrate’s Court err in finding Mr. Lang guilty of disobedience to a lawful order of the court pursuant to § 46 of the Code of Criminal Offenses, for failing to appear for his trial?

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On January 1, 1996, a Metlakatla Police Officer arrested and charged Mr. Lang with liquor possession, a violation of § 52 of the Code of Criminal Offenses, and resisting lawful arrest, a violation of § 17 of that Code. On January 2, 1996, the Magistrate’s Court notified Mr. Lang that the hearing on the charges would take place on January 18, 1996 at 9:30 a.m.

Mr. Lang failed to appear in court at 9:30 a.m. on January 18, 1996. At that time, the Magistrate’s Court entered a default judgment against Mr. Lang, finding him guilty on both charges. The Magistrate’s Court also issued a Warrant to Apprehend Mr. Lang for his failure to appear.

Later in the day on January 18, 1996, Mr. Lang appeared for a hearing on the Warrant to Apprehend for failure to appear. Appellant states that at this second hearing, he pled “not guilty” to the charge of disobedience to a lawful order of the court. The record indicates a plea of “no contest”. The Magistrate’s Court found Mr. Lang guilty of disobedience to a lawful order of the court because he failed to appear at the 9:30 a.m. hearing, and assessed a five-thousand dollars ($5,000.00) fine, suspending all except five-hundred dollars ($500.00).

On January 19, 1996, Mr. Lang filed his Notice of Appeal. Appellant appeals the Magistrate’s Court entry of a default judgment on the liquor possession and resisting arrest charges, as well as the judgment and sentence for disobedience to a lawful order of the court. Mr. Lang has

4 NICS App. 86, MIC v. LANG (July 1996) p. 88

not paid any fines, pending adjudication of this appeal.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Guilt by Default

Ordinance No. 653 (Ordinance Relating to Law and Order) establishes the Metlakatla Magistrate’s Court criminal procedures. Title I, § 12(b) of that Ordinance provides:

If a person fails to appear before the Magistrate’s Court as lawfully required, the Magistrate shall enter such failure in the record of the proceeding, and may order the forfeiture of the bond and issue an Arrest Warrant. . . .

Thus, when Mr. Lang failed to appear for his scheduled hearing, the Magistrate’s Court had the authority only to enter the failure in the trial court record, order the forfeiture of the bond, and issue an arrest warrant. Neither § 12(b) nor any other section of the Code authorizes the Magistrate’s Court to find a criminal defendant guilty by default. In fact, § 13 of Ordinance No. 653, in outlining a defendant’s basic rights, expressly provides:

In proceedings in the Magistrate’s Court any defendant shall be entitled to . . . the right to be present throughout the proceeding and to defend himself in person or (at his own expense) by counsel; . . . the right to meet the witnesses against him face to fact, [and] . . . the right to a speedy public trial. . . .

Ordinance No 653, §§ 13(1), (3), and (6) (emphasis added).

Further, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (hereinafter “ICRA”) provides that “[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its law or deprive any person of liberty or property without the due process of law. . . .” 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8). One of the requirements of due process is the meaningful opportunity to be heard in a full and fair hearing. In re the Welfare of D.D., 3 NICS App. 269, 270 (Port Gamble S’Klallam 1994). See, also, Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969).¹

4 NICS App. 86, MIC v. LANG (July 1996) p. 89

When the Magistrate’s Court found Mr. Lang guilty by default, it deprived him of the rights guaranteed him both by the Code of Criminal Offenses and by the ICRA. Mr. Lang was not present throughout the proceeding at which he was found guilty; he did not have the opportunity to defend himself, present evidence, or confront the witnesses against him; he did not have a public trial. The Magistrate’s Court then proceeded to impose a sentence which included several fines.

This Court finds that Mr. Lang did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard in a full and fair hearing. The Magistrate’s Court erred in finding Mr. Lang guilty by default.

B. Failure to Appear

When Mr. Lang failed to appear for his hearing on January 18, 1996, the Magistrate’s Court issued a Warrant to Apprehend. The warrant was never served. Approximately two hours after the hearing was to have commenced, Mr. Lang realized that he had inadvertently missed his trial, whereupon he telephoned the Court and requested a hearing. Mr. Lang was informed that the Magistrate’s Court had entered a finding of guilt on the criminal charges and, furthermore, that a warrant for his arrest had issued.

Mr. Lang states that upon learning that the Magistrate’s Court had issued a warrant for his arrest, he immediately went to court to resolve the matter. At that time, the Magistrate’s Court charged him with violating § 46 of the Code of Criminal Offenses (disobedience to a lawful order of the court), found him guilty, and imposed a fine.

Section 46 of the Code of Criminal Offenses (Disobedience to Lawful Order of the Court) provides:

Any person who shall willfully disobey any lawful order, subpoena, warrant or command duly issued, made or given by the Magistrate’s Court of the Metlakatla Indian Community or any Magistrate thereof, shall be sentenced to labor for a period of not more than three (3) months or to pay a fine not to exceed the Constitutional limit, or both, with costs. [Emphasis added].

There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Magistrate’s Court found Mr. Lang had “willfully” disobeyed an order of the court. To the contrary, it appears that Mr. Lang merely forgot that he had a court date. Mere inadvertence does not rise to the level of willful disobedience:

An act of omission is “willfully” done, if done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. The word [willfully] often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. . . .

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 824, (5TH ed. 1983) (emphasis added).

4 NICS App. 86, MIC v. LANG (July 1996) p. 90

There has been no showing that Mr. Lang voluntarily, intentionally, and specifically intended not to appear for his court date. Intent, as a component of any “willful” act or omission, is an element of the crime of willful disobedience. The Magistrate’s Court made no specific finding of intent or “willfulness”. This Court finds that the Magistrate’s Court erred in finding Mr. Lang guilty of violating § 46 of the Code of Criminal Offenses and erred in imposing a fine for the violation.

V. ORDER

It is hereby ordered that the default judgment entered by the Magistrate’s Court finding Mr. Lang guilty of liquor possession and resisting lawful arrest is reversed. The matter is remanded to the Magistrate’s Court for a hearing on the merits.

It is further ordered that the judgment and sentence of the Magistrate’s Court for disobedience to a lawful order of the court is vacated.

While Federal, State, and other Tribal law are not binding upon this Court, such authority may be instructive and this Court may look to it for guidance:

“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).

Hearing must be “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1969).