OLIN v. WAGNER

4 NICS App. 94, OLIN v. WAGNER (July 1996)

IN THE METLAKATLA TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS

METLAKATLA INDIAN COMMUNITY

METLAKATLA, ALASKA

Edith & Dale Olin, Appellants

Walter Wagner, Respondent

No. 95-06 (July 31, 1996)

SUMMARY

Appeal from trial court judgment and order to pay respondent one-thousand dollars for services rendered. Finding no evidence in the record to support trial court’s judgment, we reverse and dismiss.

FULL TEXT

Before: Elbridge Coochise, Chief Justice; Dennis L. Nelson, Justice; John L. Roe, Justice.

Appearances: Edith Olin and Dale Olin, pro se Appellants. Respondent Walter Wagner failed to appear.

This matter came before the Metlakatla Tribal Court of Appeals pursuant to Appellants’ Notice of Appeal filed on June 30, 1995. Appellants appeal from the June 30, 1989 Magistrate's Court judgment in which they were ordered to remit one-thousand dollars ($1,000.00) to Walter Wagner as payment for land preparation services.

I. JURISDICTION

This Court has personal jurisdiction over Walter Wagner and Edith Olin because they are members of the Metlakatla Indian Community; this Court has personal jurisdiction over Dale Olin because he is a resident of and is married to a member of the Metlakatla Indian Community. The act which is the subject of this appeal occurred within the exterior boundaries of the Metlakatla Indian Reservation, giving rise to this Court’s territorial jurisdiction. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Ordinance 702, § 2(a) and Article V of the Metlakatla Constitution.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellants Dale and Edith Olin sold a mobile home to Tom and Stella Atkinson, both

4 NICS App. 94, OLIN v. WAGNER (July 1996) p. 95

residents of the Metlakatla Indian Community. The Atkinsons planned to place the home on a lot they owned. In February of 1988, allegedly on the Atkinson’s behalf, Mr. Olin requested Respondent Walter Wagner’s services in “filling” a lot owned by the Atkinsons in preparation for installing the home on the lot.

Appellants state that Mr. Wagner understood the purpose for filling the lot (i.e., that it would need to support the Atkinson’s double-wide mobile home) and agreed to fill the land with some type of rock for approximately $700.00. Appellants state that they subsequently learned that the industry standard was to use a substance called “D-1" as fill and that they relied upon Mr. Wagner’s knowledge of that industry standard.

Appellants allege that the fill Mr. Wagner used was not D-1 and was not adequate. After the work was completed and the house installed, it became clear that the lot would not support the home.

In March of 1988, Mr. Wagner submitted a bill to Mr. Olin for the sum of $1495.00. The bill indicates that the sum is for equipment rental and labor. Appellants did not pay Mr. Wagner, claiming that he had used “mud” instead of the agreed-upon “rock” to fill the land and thereby failed to abide by the terms of the oral agreement. Further, Appellants dispute the amount of the bill, claiming that the agreed price was $700.00.

On May 6, 1989, Mr. Wagner filed a Complaint against Mr. Olin alleging that Mr. Olin had failed to pay him for his land preparation services. The complaint alleges that the bill was based upon an “agreed upon” hourly rate for labor and equipment rental.

This matter was heard in the Magistrate’s Court on June 30, 1989. Pursuant to the hearing, the Magistrate’s Court ordered Appellants to pay Mr. Wagner one-thousand dollars ($1000.00). On June 30, 1995 Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal. Appellants have not made any payments pending adjudication of this appeal.

III. ISSUE

The issue on appeal is whether the Magistrate’s Court erred in entering a $1,000.00 judgment against Appellants Dale and Edith Olin.

IV. DISCUSSION

Appellants appeal the judgment of the Magistrate’s Court, claiming that it is not supported by the evidence. In order to adequately review the decision of the Magistrate’s Court, a reviewing court must have a complete record of the proceedings below. A complete record should include a transcript of recorded proceedings in the lower court as well as “. . . a summary of the proceedings, a copy of the opinion in the case, . . . and all evidence presented to [the Magistrate’s Court].”

4 NICS App. 94, OLIN v. WAGNER (July 1996) p. 96

Ordinance No. 86-739, § 11. See, also, Suquamish Indian Tribe v. Purser, 2 NICS App. 176 (Suquamish 1992) (Court of Appeals held that “in the absence of a full and adequate court transcript . . . it would be impossible to rule upon questions arising under the record . . . .” Id. at 178. Decision of the trial court was reversed.)

The record of the lower court proceedings in this matter is woefully deficient. First, the record contains no trial court transcript. Second, the only summary of the proceedings appears in the form of the handwritten notes whose author is unidentified. Third, from the record before us, it is impossible to determine whether either party to the proceedings submitted to the Magistrate’s Court any documents in support of his position. Appellants state that they submitted photographs of the Atkinson’s house on the mud-filled lot; the photographs appear to be missing from the trial court file.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this Court reviews, instead of a full written opinion, a judgment unsupported by any findings of fact or conclusions of law. Consequently, the parties and this Court cannot discern upon what facts the Magistrate’s Court based its decision, nor can we determine how the lower court arrived at the $1000.00 figure which it ordered Appellant to pay to Mr. Wagner.

The Magistrate’s Court failed to address certain key factual and legal issues before rendering its judgment. First, this Court can find no evidence in the record of a factual determination of who are the “proper parties” to this action. Second, this Court can find no evidence regarding a determination of whether all the necessary parties to this action have been joined. Third, we can find no evidence that the lower court has determined whether, in fact, a contract exists.

Insofar as the original Complaint names Dale Olin as Defendant (and is later amended to name Edith Olin as Defendant), the parties do not dispute that Mr. Wagner and Mr. Olin verbally agreed that Mr. Wagner would provide the land preparation services. The parties do not dispute that the Atkinsons own the lot which Mr. Wagner prepared pursuant to the oral agreement. The Magistrate’s Court, however, did not determine whether Mr. Olin procured Mr. Wagner’s services independently or whether he did so as the Atkinson’s agent, i.e., at their request and under their direction.

The factual determination of Mr. Olin’s status as an independent contractor or as an agent leads to the question of whether all the necessary parties to this action have been joined. If the Magistrate’s Court had found that Mr. Olin acted as the Atkinson’s agent in the transaction with Mr. Wagner, then the Atkinsons, as principals, are indispensable parties who should have been joined.

4 NICS App. 94, OLIN v. WAGNER (July 1996) p. 97

See, also, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, § 19(a)¹; Peloza v. Freas, 871 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1994)².

Finally, the record below does not contain sufficient facts to determine whether the “agreement” between Mr. Olin and Mr. Wagner constitutes a contract. A review of even the sparse facts in the record indicates there may not have been the “meeting of the minds” required for the formation of a contract. Mr. Olin states that Mr. Wagner agreed to fill the lot with “rock” for seven-hundred dollars ($700.00); Mr. Wagner alleges that Mr. Olin agreed to pay an hourly rate for labor and equipment rental. The Magistrate’s Court made no specific findings regarding the existence of an enforceable contract.

The Magistrate’s Court ultimately ordered Appellants to pay Mr. Wagner one-thousand dollars ($1,000.00). The record does not indicate how the lower court arrived at this figure. This Court of Appeals cannot uphold the decision of the Magistrate’s Court absent an adequate factual basis for that decision in the record. Wells v. Wells, 2 NICS App. 166, 169 (Nisqually 1992).

4 NICS App. 94, OLIN v. WAGNER (July 1996) p. 98

V. CONCLUSION and ORDER

This court finds that the judgment of the Magistrates’s Court is not supported by the evidence in the record. Therefore, based on the foregoing,

It is hereby ordered that the judgment of the Magistrate’s Court is reversed. This matter is hereby dismissed.

Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, § 19(a) provides:

A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. . . .

In Peloza v. Freas, 871 P.2d 687 (Alaska 1994) a City Council candidate brought an action challenging the constitutionality of city charter's residency requirement. At trial, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff on ground that plaintiff had failed to join the City of Kenai as an indispensable party under Civil Rule 19. The Peloza court, quoting State v. Crosby, 410 P.2d 724 (Alaska 1966) discussed the test for determining when a party is indispensable:

An indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy before the court is such that the court cannot render an equitable judgment without having jurisdiction over such party. The determination of indispensability or lack of it involves a discretionary balancing of interests. On the one hand, consideration must be given to the possibility of rendering a judgment that will have an adverse factual effect on the interests of persons not before the court, and to the danger of inconsistent decisions, and the desire to avoid a multiplicity of actions, and a reluctance to enter a judgment that will not end the litigation. On the other hand, consideration must be given to the desirability of having some adjudication if at all possible rather than none, leaving the parties before the court without a remedy because of an "ideal desire to have all interested persons before the court." Courts exists for the determination of disputes, and they have an obligation in particular litigation to make meaningful determinations if at all possible.

Peloza, 871 P.2d at 689.