KELSEY v. TERO COMM’N

5 NICS App. 50, KELSEY v. TERO COMM’N (May 1998)

IN THE HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS

HOOPA VALLEY INDIAN RESERVATION

HOOPA, CALIFORNIA

Andrea Kelsey, Appellant,

TERO Commission & Margaret Powell, as Director, Respondents.

No. C-96-060 (May 15, 1998)

SUMMARY

Appellant was terminated from her employment with the tribe. Appellant filed a grievance with the TERO Commission, which found nothing to substantiate her complaint. The TERO office subsequently received an unsigned, undated document. Six months later, Appellant requested the trial court to construe that document as a request for a hearing. The trial court denied her request. Finding the document failed to meet minimum threshold requirements to constitute a formal pleading, we affirm.

FULL TEXT

Before: Elbridge Coochise, Chief Justice; Douglas W. Hutchinson^*, Justice; Thomas W. Weissmuller, Justice.

THIS MATTER came before the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court of Appeals pursuant to Andrea Kelsey’s Notice of Appeal filed on June 12, 1997, and received in this Court on June 23, 1997. Ms. Kelsey appeals from the June 2, 1997, order of the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court denying her Motion for Declaratory Relief. The parties, by stipulated agreement, waived oral argument.

I. BACKGROUND

Andrea Kelsey was terminated from her employment with the Hoopa Valley Development Enterprises on December 29, 1995. On February 2, 1996, Ms. Kelsey filed a grievance with the Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance (TERO) Commission. TERO Director Margaret Powell investigated the grievance and, on February 23, 1996, issued her report. Director Powell’s report stated that she had “not [found] anything to substantiate” Ms. Kelsey’s complaint and, further, found that Ms. Kelsey had failed to comply with grievance procedures.

5 NICS App. 50, KELSEY v. TERO COMM’N (May 1998) p. 51

On March 1, 1996, a young child delivered a one-page, unsigned, and undated document to the TERO office. The document contained hand-written notes; however, it bore no markings of any sort that identified its author.

Six months later, Ms. Kelsey filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief. In that Complaint, she requested the court to construe the hand-delivered, hand-written document as her request for a hearing and to grant her a hearing on the merits before the TERO Commission. The trial court, finding that Ms. Kelsey had “failed to prove by extrinsic evidence at the hearing that the document submitted was in fact an appeal or a request for a hearing,” denied her request. This appeal followed.

II. JURISDICTION

This Court has personal jurisdiction over Appellant Andrea Kelsey because she is a member of the Hoopa Valley Tribe. The act which is the subject of this appeal occurred within the exterior boundaries of the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation, giving rise to territorial jurisdiction. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Title I, §1.1.04 of the Hoopa Valley Tribal Code.

III. ISSUE ON APPEAL

The sole issue on appeal is whether the hand-written note delivered to the TERO office on March 1, 1996, sufficed as a notice of appeal under the TERO rules.

IV. DISCUSSION

The opportunity to be heard is one requirement of due process. Hoopa Valley Indian Housing Authority v. Gerstner, 3 NICS App. 250, 258 (Hoopa 1993); MIC v. Lang, 4 NICS App. 86, 88 (Metlakatla 1996). The right of due process, however, carries concomitant responsibilities, among them, timely filing and proper service on all parties. The purpose of a notice of appeal is to place opposing parties and an appellate court on notice that a party is challenging a lower court decision.

TERO Hearing Rule I(B)(1) provides:

Any and all requests for a hearing must be made in writing and must be received at TERO no later than ten (10) work days after mailing or personal delivery of the report [of the Director’s investigation].

The rule does not specify the contents of a notice of appeal; however, it does require a document to meet at least three requirements: (1) there must be a request; (2) it must be in writing; and (3) it must be received at the TERO office no later than ten days after delivery of the Director’s investigative report.

5 NICS App. 50, KELSEY v. TERO COMM’N (May 1998) p. 52

It is not clear from the face of the document that it is either a request, or that it is in regard to Ms. Kelsey. Although the word “appeal” appears once in the document, it appears to be part of some handwritten personal notes and is not in the context of a request. No document containing Ms. Kelsey’s request for a hearing arrived at the TERO office within the ten-day time limit.

The trial court considered Ms. Kelsey’s argument that the TERO ordinance should be liberally construed in favor of the right to file a grievance. Nevertheless, the lower court found that “‘liberal construction’ does not give the court the authority to read into a document what is not there.” We agree.

Common sense and reasonableness dictate that any document filed in a court of law should stand on its own. In other words, opposing parties and the court should be able to read and determine the nature of a filed document without resort to other sources of information. To that end, a filed document should contain, at the very least, a date, the name of the party appealing, the decision from which she is appealing, and the reasons for the appeal. The hand-written document submitted to TERO on March 1, 1997, does not meet this minimum threshold. TERO Hearing Rule I (B) (1) does not require the court to delve into subjective belief or intent of the parties, and this Court will not so speculate.

V. CONCLUSION

We agree with the trial court that the hand-written document delivered to the TERO office on March 1, 1997, does not constitute a notice of appeal. The trial court decision is supported by substantial evidence and is neither arbitrary nor capricious.

VI. ORDER

Therefore, based on the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that the June 2, 1997, trial court order denying Ms. Kelsey’s Motion for Declaratory Relief is affirmed.

Due to unforeseen circumstances, Justice Douglas Hutchinson is no longer able to participate in the consideration of this matter. This Opinion is the unanimous decision of the remaining members of the appellate panel.