5 NICS App. 142, HOOPA v. GRANT (November 1999)

IN THE HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS

HOOPA VALLEY INDIAN RESERVATION

HOOPA, CALIFORNIA

Hoopa Valley Tribe & Hoopa Valley Tribal Council, Appellants

v.

Millie Grant, Respondent

No. A-99-005 (November 29, 1999)

SUMMARY

Appellant Tribe appeals from a trial court decision to construe Respondent’s Motion for Remand as a demurrer, granting Respondent’s Motion to Remand to the Tribal Employment Rights (TERO) Commission by dismissing the tribe’s action at the trial court level for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reviews this case de novo.

The TERO Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over grievances arising under the Tribe’s Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual, with the exception that political appointees only have appeal rights in cases of alleged discrimination.

Trial court applied demurrer analysis to Respondent’s Motion for Remand. Appellate Court overruled trial court’s employment of demurrer analysis because there are clear procedures which allow trial court to rule directly on the motion without resort to a demurrer analysis. Nevertheless, Appellate Court agrees that trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pending exhaustion of administrative remedies and holds the trial court’s decision to remand to the TERO Commission was correct. Current proceedings stayed in order to allow TERO Commission to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction and to conclude its proceedings.

FULL TEXT

Before:            Charles R. Hostnik, Chief Justice; Darwin S. Long Fox, Justice; Thomas W. Weissmuller, Justice.

Appearances:  Shayleen Allen, counsel for Appellants; Millie Grant, Respondent, pro se.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

Respondent Millie Grant is employed by the Hoopa Valley Tribe as the Director of the Department of Social Services. In February of 1996, Ms. Grant took on the duties of the “Fit for

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Duty” Officer, a position she held in addition to her regular position as Director of the Department of Social Services. On a number of occasions, Ms. Grant requested additional compensation for her role as the Fit for Duty Officer.

At its December 16, 1998, meeting, the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council (Council) moved to deny Ms. Grant’s request for payment. The motion was defeated. On December 22, 1998, the Council issued a check to Ms. Grant in the amount of $13,093.82.

On January 4, 1999, the Council met and again voted on Ms. Grant’s request for payment. This time, the motion to deny Ms. Grant’s request was passed. Two days later, a representative from the Office of the Tribal Attorney hand-delivered a letter to Ms. Grant. That letter informed her that the payment had been a mistake, and demanded repayment of the full amount by no later than January 8, 1999. She did not comply. Instead, on February 17, 1999, she filed a grievance with the TERO Commission.

On March 5, 1999, before the TERO Commission had an opportunity to review the matter, the tribe and Council filed in tribal court a Complaint for Restitution and Monetary Damages. The complaint alleged that an individual ineligible to vote had participated in the December 16th vote and therefore, that payment of the $13,093.82 was not authorized by the Council. Ms. Grant filed a Motion for Order of Remand to the TERO Commission, citing lack of trial court jurisdiction and alleging that “disputes of this type are to be resolved first before the TERO Commission with a right of appeal to the tribal court.”

The tribe’s opposition to the Motion for Remand claimed that the sole issue was unauthorized payment of funds and, as such, that jurisdiction over this matter lay exclusively with the trial court and not with the TERO Commission. The tribe also filed a Motion to Strike one of the exhibits to Ms. Grant’s motion. The trial court did not rule on the Motion to Strike.

The trial court, construing Ms. Grant’s Motion for Remand as a demurrer, dismissed the action for the tribe’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This matter comes before us as an appeal from the trial court’s decision granting a motion to remand this case to the TERO Commission. In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we are sitting in the same position as was the trial court in ruling on the motion. Therefore, this is a de novo review of that trial court decision.

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III. JURISDICTION

A. Territorial and Personal Jurisdiction

The Hoopa Valley Tribal Court of Appeals has territorial jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Hoopa Valley Tribal Code (H.V.T.C.) §1.1.04(a), as all alleged events took place within the exterior boundaries of the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation. This Court has personal jurisdiction over both parties pursuant to H.V.T.C. §1.1.04(b). Appellant Tribe voluntarily elected to file this action in tribal court, thereby consenting to the jurisdiction of this Court. Ms. Grant is a tribal member who resides within the exterior boundaries of the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation.

B. Tribal Court Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The tribe filed a Complaint for Restitution and Monetary Damages pursuant to Title 28 of the Hoopa Valley Tribal Code. It is the tribe’s position that the payment delivered to and accepted by Ms. Grant was unauthorized and constitutes a debt as defined by H.V.T.C. §28.2.1. The tribe points out that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over actions to collect debts owed to the tribe pursuant to H.V.T.C. §28.5.

Ms. Grant contends the payment is not a debt she owes the tribe, but rather a debt the tribe owes her for services rendered as Fit for Duty Officer. That was the nature of the motion before the tribal council which resulted in issuance of the check to Ms. Grant which the tribe now seeks to recover. To the extent that Ms. Grant counterclaims that she is due some or all of those funds, subject matter jurisdiction also exists under H.V.T.C. §28.16.2.

C. TERO Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Even though the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under Title 28 of the Hoopa Valley Code, Ms. Grant argues that subject matter jurisdiction is defeated by the exclusive jurisdiction of the TERO Commission.

The TERO Commission has:

. . . exclusive and independent investigation and administrative review of personnel actions and grievances arising under the Personnel Policies and Procedures of the Hoopa Valley Tribe . . . or other Council enactments regulating employment practices of the tribe or its entities. . . .

H.V.T.C. §13.3.1 (in part). It therefore appears that the TERO Commission would have exclusive jurisdiction over Ms. Grant’s TERO complaint. However, under the tribe’s Personnel Policies, persons serving as political appointees have no appeal rights except in cases of alleged discrimination. Personnel Policies and Procedures of the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council, §3.1.1. Therefore, an issue arises as to whether: (a) Ms. Grant’s Fit for Duty Officer position was a political

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appointment position, and (b) if so, does she allege discrimination? Those are preliminary determinations which prevent this Court from fully adjudicating the case at this stage of the proceedings.

IV. ARE COMMON ISSUES PRESENTED?

The tribe has taken the position that the unauthorized payment to Ms. Grant should be viewed in a vacuum, by itself, regardless of the reason for which that payment was made. This Court disagrees. The tribal council action which resulted in issuance of the check was a motion before the Council to make payment to Ms. Grant for her services as Fit for Duty Officer. Ms. Grant’s complaint before the TERO Commission seeks compensation for those exact same duties. We cannot view the tribe’s complaint in a vacuum, but must look at all of the circumstances leading to the filing of that complaint.

We also take judicial notice of the fact that Ms. Grant filed her complaint with the TERO Commission before the tribe filed its complaint with the trial court. It is clear that both the TERO complaint and the trial court complaint involve a common question of law or fact. Under Rule 17 of the Hoopa Valley Rules of Court, it is appropriate to consolidate actions which involve a common question of law or fact. In order to obtain a complete result without duplication of effort, it is appropriate to consolidate these actions.

V. DEMURRER ANALYSIS

The trial court employed an interesting analysis to rule on Ms. Grant’s Motion to Remand. It determined that the motion constituted a “demurrer,” and analyzed the motion on that basis. No such procedure exists in the Hoopa Valley Tribal Code.

Ms. Grant’s motion was denominated a Motion to Remand. The relief sought was to dismiss the tribe’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and to remand to the TERO Commission. Ms. Grant contended she had previously filed a complaint before the TERO Commission to resolve the longstanding issue surrounding payment for her duties as Fit for Duty Officer. She further contended that the TERO Commission was the proper forum to determine that dispute. Determination of that dispute is a condition precedent to collection of funds allegedly paid in an unauthorized manner by the tribe.

There are clear procedures in both the Hoopa Valley Tribal Code and Rules of Court which would allow the trial court to rule directly on Ms. Grant’s motion, without employing a demurrer analysis. For example, if the Motion to Remand was viewed as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it could have been construed as a motion for summary judgment. See H.V.T.C. §2.4.04 of the Hoopa Valley Tribal Code and Rule 31 of the Rules of Court. If it was viewed as a motion to dismiss on some other grounds, Rule 15(b) provides a procedure for ruling on such motions. We also note that H.V.T.C. §2.4.05 addresses the procedure to deal with motions in general. There was no need for the trial court to look outside these clear procedures to resolve Ms.

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Grant’s motion. To the extent the trial court did so, it is expressly overruled in employing the demurrer analysis.

Nevertheless, the result achieved by the trial court was appropriate. The trial court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action pending exhaustion of administrative remedies provided by the TERO Commission. This would be appropriate if the TERO Commission has jurisdiction to hear Ms. Grant’s complaint. As noted above, the TERO Commission will need to determine if it has such jurisdiction. If it does not have jurisdiction, then the case is properly before the trial court.

VI. DECISION AND ORDER

The current proceedings shall be stayed in order to allow the TERO Commission to conclude its proceedings. The stay shall be lifted when:

1)        The TERO Commission determines that it has no jurisdiction, either because the position is a political appointment or for some other reason; or

2)        The TERO proceedings are concluded without any appeal being filed to this Court; or

3)        The TERO proceedings are concluded and an appeal is filed to this Court. If an appeal is so filed, such an appeal shall be consolidated with this action pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.

The stay will be lifted upon the occurrence of any one of these three events, allowing Ms. Grant to file an answer. Until that time, no additional pleadings will be filed with the trial court.

When the Motion to Remand was filed by Ms. Grant, the tribe filed a Motion to Strike certain exhibits to Ms. Grant’s motion. The trial court order of April 23, 1999, does not specifically rule on that Motion to Strike. The tribe on April 28, 1999, appealed from the trial court order. It is unclear as to whether the trial court has ruled on the Motion to Strike. We decline to rule on that motion, in order to allow the trial court to specifically rule on that Motion to Strike at the time the stay is lifted.