7 NICS App. 65, MATILTON v. HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE (August 2005)
IN THE HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS
HOOPA VALLEY INDIAN RESERVATION
HOOPA, CALIFORNIA
Raymond Matilton, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Hoopa Valley Tribe, et al., Defendant/Appellant.
No. C-97-114/A-02-005 (August 11, 2005)
SYLLABUS*
More than two years after an employee was terminated, the trial court issued an order directing the Tribal Employee Rights Ordinance Commission (“TERO”) to retain an independent investigator to complete an investigation of the employee’s appeal within 45 days. After another year passed without any investigation, the trial court removed the matter from TERO’s jurisdiction; ordered the employee to file a complaint in the trial court; proceeded to a hearing on the merits, and ultimately entered a decision in favor of the employee. Court of Appeals holds (1) objections to jurisdiction cannot be waived; (2) tribal code set forth a comprehensive scheme requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies; (3) trial court had no jurisdiction or authority to dictate procedures to TERO not required by statutory scheme; and (4) trial court had no authority or jurisdiction to remove the matter from TERO jurisdiction or hear an original complaint for wrongful termination. Order dictating procedural requirements not required by the statutory scheme and all subsequent orders of the trial court reversed and vacated and matter remanded to TERO for further proceedings.
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Robert Miller, Chief Justice; Lisa Atkinson, Justice; Eric Nielsen, Justice. |
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Grett L. Hurley and Steven D. Moe, Office of Tribal Attorney, for Appellant Hoopa Valley Tribe; John F. Shields, for Appellee Raymond Matilton. |
OPINION
This matter comes before the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Appellant Hoopa Valley Tribe’s Amended Notice of Appeal filed with the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court on November 29, 2004. This Court convened on June 16, 2005 to hear oral argument from the parties on the issue
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of whether the Tribal Court had original subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. Having fully considered the written briefs and oral argument of the parties and relevant tribal law and supplemental authority cited by the parties, this Court reverses and vacates the September 26, 2002 Decision and Order of the Tribal Court and remands for further proceedings in accord with this Opinion and Order.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
Appellee Raymond Matilton was the Chief Executive Officer of the Hoopa Valley Health Association. On August 15, 1997, the Health Association terminated Mr. Matilton’s employment. In August and September of 1997, Mr. Matilton took certain actions to appeal his termination. On October 14, 1997, the Director of the Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance Commission (hereinafter “TERO Commission” or “TERO”) dismissed Mr. Matilton’s appeal as untimely. On December 4, 1997, the TERO Commission affirmed the TERO Director’s decision to dismiss Mr. Matilton’s appeal as untimely. Mr. Matilton appealed the Commission’s decision to the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court. On September 15, 1999, the Tribal Court ruled that Mr. Matilton had timely filed his appeal and reversed the decision and remanded the matter to TERO for further proceedings. The Hoopa Valley Tribe then appealed the decision of the Tribal Court. On October 7, 1999, the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court of Appeals dismissed the Tribe’s appeal of the September 15 Order of the Tribal Court. On November 24, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the Tribe’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, two years and one month following Mr. Matilton’s termination, the Tribal Court remanded the matter to TERO for an investigation and an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Matilton’s original appeal of his termination. The remand order specified that the investigation be conducted by “an independent investigator/administrator agreed upon by the parties” and that the investigation “be completed within 45 days.”
Nearly a year passed following the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the Tribe’s appeal of the remand to TERO with little or no action by TERO.1 During this period, the Tribal Court continued to entertain various motions and status reports from the parties and TERO. In response to these motions and status reports, the Tribal Court issued multiple orders, solicited
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briefs, and held at least two hearings. Much of this post-remand Tribal Court activity involved Mr. Matilton’s requests that the Tribal Court take action, including the imposition of sanctions, to enforce the provisions of the Tribal Court’s September 15, 1999 Decision and Order requiring TERO to retain an independent investigator.2 At a hearing on November 17, 2000, the Tribal Court issued an oral Order removing the matter from TERO’s jurisdiction and directing Matilton to file a “complaint” in the Tribal Court. On November 20, 2000, the Tribal Court issued a written Order removing the matter from TERO and setting a briefing schedule and trial on the merits. The Tribal Court then proceeded to hear the merits of Mr. Matilton’s appeal. On September 26, 2002, the Tribal Court entered a Decision and Order in favor of Mr. Matilton. The Tribe then brought this appeal.
II. Standard of Review
The Hoopa Valley Tribal Code does not specify the standard of review for trial court decisions. Title 2 HVTC § 2.1.01 provides that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant cases may be cited as persuasive authority where the federal rules are analogous to Hoopa Rules of Court, and we look to federal law for guidance where the tribal code is silent. Hoopa Valley Housing Authority v. Doolittle, Case No. C-03-068/A-04-009 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. App. 2005). “For purposes of standard of review, decisions by judges are traditionally divided into three categories, denominated questions of law (reviewable de novo), questions of fact (reviewable for clear error), and matters of discretion (reviewable for ‘abuse of discretion’).” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 558, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2546 (1988); accord Doolittle, supra; Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 5 NICS App. 37, 37 – 38 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. App. 1998); Dodge v. Hoopa Valley Gaming Commission, Hoopa Valley Case No.: C-2-002/A-02-002 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. App. 2005). Whether the Tribal Court had jurisdiction to proceed as it did is a question of law which we review de novo.
III. Appellate Jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to “hear appeals from final judgments, sentences and other final orders of the Tribal Court.” Title 1 Hoopa Valley Tribal Code §1.4.01(a). The Tribal Court’s September 26, 2002 Decision and Order is a final order for purposes of HVTC §1.4.01(a) and the Tribe timely filed its Amended Notice of Appeal and otherwise complied with the filing requirements of the Hoopa Valley Code. Jurisdiction is therefore properly vested in this Court to hear this appeal.
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IV. Tribal Court Jurisdiction
The threshold issue this Court must address is whether the Tribal Court had jurisdiction to remove this matter from TERO and decide the matter on the merits. We hold that it did not.
Title 1 Hoopa Valley Tribal Code §1.1.04(b) in effect at the relevant times3 granted the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court extremely broad jurisdiction over both persons and subject matter. The authority granted to the Tribal Court by Title 2 HVTC §2.1.04 to decide matters where “no written Tribal law applies to a cause of action or the issues involved in an action” reinforces the broad grant of subject matter jurisdiction in former Title 1 HVTC §1.1.04(b). See also In re D.L.M., Hoopa Valley Case No. J-01-002/A-04-002 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. App. 2005).
The broad grant of subject matter jurisdiction contained in Title 1 HVTC 1.1.04(b), however, is not unlimited. Former Title 1 HVTC §1.1.04(d) provided
The Court shall have no jurisdiction over any suit brought against the Tribe, its officials for money judgments without the consent of the Tribe. Nothing contained within this code shall be deemed to constitute a waiver or renunciation of the sovereign immunity of the Tribe to suit. Such consent or waiver must be expressly made by the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council by majority vote through passage of an ordinance, by resolution, by entering into a written contract which provides for such waiver, or other means adopted by the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council.
Mr. Matilton’s suit is for a money judgment against the Tribe. HVTC §1.1.04(d) therefore applies to Mr. Matilton’s suit.
By its express terms, §1.1.04(d) makes the subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribal Court contingent upon compliance with such ordinances, resolutions or other means adopted by the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council that effect a waiver of the Tribe’s sovereign immunity to a suit. The ordinance that waived the Tribe’s sovereign immunity to Mr. Matilton’s suit is Ordinance No. 2-80, as amended by Tribal Council Resolution of April 27, 1995 and codified at Title 13 Hoopa Valley Tribal Code (the TERO Ordinance). Titles 1 and 2 of the Tribal Code further define the Tribal Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
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Titles 1, 2 and 13 form a statutory scheme that requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before proceeding to Tribal Court on a claim of wrongful termination under the TERO Ordinance. "All matters" arising under the ordinance "shall be . . . administered and adjudicated exclusively" under the procedures set forth in the ordinance irrespective of other tribal laws, policies or the rules of appellate procedure. April 27, 1995 Tribal Council Resolution amending Ordinance 2 –80 (emphasis added); Title 13 HVTC §13.3.1. The TERO Commission is to have "exclusive and independent investigation and administrative review of personnel actions and grievances." Title 13 HVTC §13.3.1 (emphasis added). The TERO Commission is granted authority to hold hearings and “determine any matter under its authority.” Title 13 HVTC §13.3.2(C) (emphasis added). The TERO Director "shall be the investigating agent for the Commission . . . ." 13 HVTC §13.3.4 (emphasis added). "Appeals of decisions of the TERO Commission may be filed under the rules of the Tribal Court." Title 13 HVTC §13.10 (emphasis added). The Tribal Court is authorized to hear and dispose of actions “brought under” Title 13. Id. “The Tribal Court shall act as the Court of Appeals to hear appeals of TERO Commission decisions.” Title 1 HVTC §1.4.01(b) (emphasis added). “Appeals of decisions of the TERO Commission are to be filed as appeals pursuant to the Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance.” Title 2 HVTC 2.6.03 (emphasis added).
A court’s primary duty in interpreting any statute is to discern and implement the intent of the legislature. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Riveland, 138 Wn. 2d 9, 19, 978 P.2d 481 (1999). The language of a statute provides "the most reliable evidence of [the legislature’s] intent." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). The starting point must always be the statute's plain language and ordinary meaning. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). In interpreting a statute, "[w]e consider not only the bare meaning" of the critical word or phrase "but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme." Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995).
Consistent with these principles of statutory construction, it is readily apparent that the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council adopted a comprehensive scheme strictly limiting the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction to review wrongful termination suits to appeals of final decisions of the TERO Commission. The Tribal Court had no jurisdiction to proceed other than in strict conformance with Title 13 and the relevant provisions of Titles 1 and 2. The Tribal Court had jurisdiction over Mr. Matilton’s appeal of TERO’s December 4, 1997 decision dismissing his TERO appeal as untimely because that was a final decision that triggered appellate review under Title 13 HVTC §13.10. However, the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction was limited to the issue of timeliness. The Tribal Court had no jurisdiction or authority to dictate to TERO procedures not required by the TERO ordinance and the Tribal Court had no jurisdiction or authority to remove the matter from TERO based on TERO’s failure to comply with such procedures.
Mr. Matilton argues that the Tribe waived any objection it may have had to the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction by participating in the trial. The record reflects a rather confused
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and inconsistent position adopted by the series of Tribal Attorneys who handled this matter, with numerous statements in the record indicating the Tribe’s objections to the Tribal Court’s exercise of jurisdiction matched by a nearly equal number of statements in the record indicating the Tribe would not object to the Tribal Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Regardless, the law is well settled that where constitutional or statutory provisions limit the jurisdiction of a court, as is the case here, objections to jurisdiction cannot be waived. See, e.g., Mansfield, C. & L. M. RY. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 511 (1884). Indeed, the rule is “inflexible and without exception” and requires the Court to deny its own jurisdiction even when not asked to do so by the parties and even when doing so will result in hardship to a party as a result of the opposing party’s failure to raise the objection. Id.
It appears from the record that poor communication among the Hoopa Health Association, the Tribal Attorney’s Office and the TERO staff and Commission contributed to a substantial delay in Mr. Matilton receiving an investigation and hearing before the TERO Commission. The proper remedy for such a delay would have been either to seek an extraordinary writ from the Tribal Court4 or file a separate cause of action under the Indian Civil Rights Acts or other relevant law.5 As much as this Court may have sympathy for Mr. Matilton, we must agree with the Tribe that Mr. Matilton did not help his own cause by encouraging the Tribal Court to act contrary to Tribal law.6
V. Attorney Fees and Costs
An award of attorney fees and costs is discretionary with the Court of Appeals. Title 2 HVTC §2.6.01(f). (“Attorney fees and costs incurred to prosecute or defend an appeal may be awarded by the Appellate Court to the prevailing party.”) Given that the Tribe, the Office of
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Tribal Attorney, the TERO and the Tribal Court have all contributed to the delay and confusion that resulted in this litigation, this Court does not find that an award of attorney fees and costs would be in the interest of justice and so no such award is made.
VI. Conclusion
This Court recognizes that a full eight years after his termination, Mr. Matilton has yet to receive a proper hearing on his claim that the termination violated tribal law. However, it is not within the power of this Court, nor would it be appropriate, to sanction an improper exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribal Court because of any sympathy we may have for Mr. Matilton. The provisions of the September 15, 1999 Decision and Order that dictate scheduling and procedural requirements not set forth in the TERO Ordinance, and all subsequent orders of the Tribal Court in this matter, including the Tribal Court’s September 26, 2002 Decision and Order, are hereby reversed and vacated and this matter is remanded to the TERO for further proceedings in conformity with this decision and the Tribal Code.
The syllabus is not a part of the Court's Opinion. The syllabus is a summary of the Opinion prepared by the publishers of this Reporter only for the convenience of the reader. Therefore, the syllabus should not be cited in whole or part as legal authority. Only the Opinion, which follows the syllabus, may be cited as legal authority.
The parties strenuously dispute who was responsible for this delay. TERO filed a status report with the Tribal Court explaining that it did not receive the Order of remand until April 19, 2000, nearly five months after the final decision of the Court of Appeals. The current Tribal Attorney blames Mr. Matilton’s attorney for naming the TERO as a party-respondent. Mr. Matilton’s attorney blames several former Tribal Attorneys for making appearances on behalf of “Respondent” without addressing the issue of potentially improperly named respondents. The Tribal Court itself issued numerous Orders identifying TERO as a Respondent in both the caption and the text of the Orders without ever questioning whether TERO was properly named. Once TERO received the remand Order, dispute over the Tribal Court’s authority to require an “independent” investigator and dictate a timeline for the investigation resulted in additional delay. This Court need not determine responsibility for the cause of these delays as it is immaterial to the determination of the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction following the remand to TERO.
The Tribe and TERO contested the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction and authority to dictate procedures, such as the “independent” investigator requirement, that vary from the TERO procedures established by Tribal code and regulations.
Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Hoopa Valley Tribal Code are to the version of the Code in effect during the period in which the Tribal Court exercised jurisdiction over these matters. Titles 1 (Judiciary), 2 (Civil Actions) and 13 (the TERO ordinance) have each been subsequently amended. Careful consideration should be given to the effect of such amendments before relying on this decision or parts thereof as precedent in any future proceedings.
While Mr. Matilton did ultimately file a pleading captioned a “Complaint” with the Tribal Court, this “Complaint” did not state a cause of action aside from the TERO claim and was filed at the direction of the Tribal Court only after the Tribal Court had improperly removed the matter from TERO jurisdiction. The fact that the Tribal Court directed Mr. Matilton to file a complaint strongly suggests that the Tribal Court itself understood that it did not have jurisdiction of a matter where TERO had yet to issue a final decision. Thus, Mr. Matilton’s “complaint” was a legal fiction that failed to trigger the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction or state a claim for which the Tribal Court could grant relief.
This Court offers no opinion as to the merits or advisability of such approaches and notes that the statute of limitations may now preclude an ICRA claim.
As discussed in note 1, supra, the dispute over whether the Tribal Court had the authority to order TERO to appoint an “independent” investigator significantly contributed to the substantial delays in these proceedings. The Tribal Court simply had no legal basis, jurisdiction or authority to require TERO to appoint an “independent” investigator. Mr. Matilton cannot complain about any delay caused due in part to his insistence that, contrary to the TERO Ordinance, an “independent” investigator be appointed.