7 NICS App. 111, IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF JULIE BILL MEZA, ET AL. (October 2006)
IN THE SAUK-SUIATTLE TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS
SAUK-SUIATTLE INDIAN RESERVATION
DARRINGTON, WASHINGTON
In re the Membership Revocation of Julie Bill Meza, Warren Bill, Andrew Bill, Melton Willard Bill, Miriam Bill, Janick Enick Bill, Daniel Moore, Gloria George Bill and John Bill, Appellants,
v.
Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribal Council and Enrollment Committee Members, Appellees.
No. SAU-CIV-10/05-106 (October 11, 2006)
SYLLABUS*
Trial court affirmed Tribal Council’s decision to revoke several tribal memberships. Court of appeals holds that Appellants (1) failed to establish that the Council’s action was clearly unsupported by the record, (2) failed to establish a denial of due process, and (3) failed to establish a basis for equitable estoppel. Court of Appeals further held that trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions on Appellants’ counsel for contempt, but trial court did abuse its discretion by setting the amount of the sanction in excess of the amount permitted by the tribal code. Trial court order affirmed, except in that the amount of the sanction for contempt is modified.
Before: Daniel A Raas, Chief Justice; Theodore Heilman-Schott, Justice; Jill S. Smith, Justice.
OPINION
Heilman-Schott, J.:
The Sauk-Suiattle Court of Appeals (hereinafter “Court”) makes the following rulings: (1) affirms the Tribal Court’s ruling that the Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Council’s decision to revoke the Appellants’ membership was not clearly unsupported by the record of decision; (2) affirms the Tribal Court’s ruling that the Appellants’ due process rights were not violated by the Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Council’s decision to revoke the Appellants’ membership; and (3) holds the Tribal Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions on the Appellants’ attorney.
7 NICS App. 111, IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF JULIE BILL MEZA, ET AL. (October 2006) p. 112
However, the Tribal Court did abuse its discretion in imposing a $150.00 sanction. Thus, the Court modifies the Tribal Court’s amount of sanctions imposed to $100.00 consistent with the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe Law and Order Code § 3.100.
I. RELEVANT FACTS
On March 25, 2005, the Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Council (hereinafter “Tribal Council”) enacted Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 03/27b/05, which rescinded Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88, and Sauk-Suiattle Resolution Nos. 03/28b/05 thru 03/34b/05, which disenrolled Warren Bill, Janice Enick Bill, Julie Bill Meza, John Bill, Miriam Bill, Melton Bill and Gloria Bill (hereinafter “Appellants”). Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88 amended the Skagit-Suiattle (Public Domain) census roll dated January 1, 1942, by adding the name of Emily (Joe) Bill. After the passage of Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88, Appellants had filed for and were granted membership into the Sauk-Suiattle Tribe on the basis that they were each a direct descendant of Emily Joe Bill.
On April 3, 2005, the Appellants filed a complaint in the Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Court (Cause No. SAU-CIV-04/03/05-001) challenging the Tribal Council’s March 25, 2005 resolutions. On April 28, 2005, the Tribal Council rescinded the March 25, 2005 resolutions.
On April 27, 2005, the Tribal Council issued written notice of a special meeting to rescind Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88. On May 16, 2005, the Tribal Council held its special meeting and, at the request of the Appellants’ counsel, continued the special meeting to June 15, 2005. On June 15, 2005, the Tribal Council reconvened the special meeting and the Appellants did not produce any documentary evidence showing that Emily Joe Bill should be properly listed on the Skagit-Suiattle (Public Domain) census roll dated January 1, 1942. The Tribal Council concluded that Emily Joe Bill was not a direct descendant of any person listed on the Skagit-Suiattle (Public Domain) census roll dated January 1, 1942 and therefore it rescinded Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88. Appellants did not appeal that decision.
The Tribal Council convened special meetings on October 3, 2005, and November 1, 2005 to consider the proposed revocation of Appellant’s Tribal membership based on the lack of evidence that the Appellants had direct decendancy from anyone listed on the Skagit-Suiattle (Public Domain) census roll dated January 1, 1942.1 The Council revoked the Appellants’ membership, concluding that the Appellants did not meet the qualifications for enrollment in the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe because the Appellants had no direct decendancy from anyone listed on the Skagit-Suiattle (Public Domain) census roll dated January 1, 1942.
7 NICS App. 111, IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF JULIE BILL MEZA, ET AL. (October 2006) p. 113
The Appellants appealed the Tribal Council’s decision to revoke their membership to the Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Court (Cause No. SAU-CIV-10/05-1006), naming the members of the Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Council and Enrollment Committee as defendants (‘Appellees’). On February 21, 2006, the Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Court issued its Opinion on and Order on Revocation Review affirming the Tribal Council’s decision to revoke the Appellants’ membership. On March 3, 2006, the Appellants appealed the Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Court’s Opinion on and Order on Revocation Review to the Sauk-Suiattle Court of Appeals.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED
A. Whether the Appellants timely filed their Notice of Appeal.
B. Whether the Tribal Council’s action to revoke the Appellants’ membership was clearly supported by the record of decision.
C. Whether the Tribal Council violated the Appellants’ procedural due process.
D. Whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel should prevent the Tribal Council’s action to revoke the Appellants’ membership.
E. Whether the Tribal Court exceeded or abused its authority when it imposed sanctions on Appellants’ attorney for failing to comply with the Court’s case management order.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issues A and C are pure issues of law. Issue D is an issue in equity. Appellate review of cases in equity is the same as for cases of law. Department of Ecology v. Grimes, 121 Wn.2d 459 (1993). Questions of law are reviewed under the non-deferential de novo standard. In re the Welfare of R.S.V.P., 26 Indian L. Rep. 6039 (Colv.Ct.App. 1998). As to this Court’s review of the disenrollment portion of Appellants’ appeal, Issue B, the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribal Enrollment Ordinance § 11(C) provides the following standard of review:
The Court shall review membership decisions of the Tribal Council based on the record of decision from Tribal Council to determine whether the Council action was clearly unsupported by the record of decision or a violation of procedural due process. Absent extraordinary circumstances established by the Appellant, the Tribal Court shall consider no evidence outside the record of decision.
That is, the Tribal Council’s decision to revoke the Appellants’ membership will be affirmed unless the Appellants can show that the membership revocation was clearly unsupported by the record of decision or that the Tribal Council’s action violated the Appellants’ due process rights.
As to this Court’s review of the Tribal Court’s ruling on sanctions, Issue E, the Court applies the ”abuse of discretion” standard:
7 NICS App. 111, IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF JULIE BILL MEZA, ET AL. (October 2006) p. 114
Review for an abuse of discretion requires that before we will overturn the Trial Court’s decision, we must find that its actions were manifestly unreasonable, exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.
Grunlose v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 27 Indian L. Rep. 6033 (Colv.Ct.App. 2000).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Timeliness of Appeal
The Appellees argue that the Appellants did not file their appeal timely. The Court, under the facts and evidence presented in this matter, does not agree.
The Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe Law and Order Code (hereinafter “LOC”) § 2.140 states in part:
Within five (5) days for the day of judgment, the aggrieved party in order to preserve his right of appeal shall file with court written notice of appeal. . . .
On February 21, 2006, the Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Court issued Opinion on and Order on Revocation Review. The trial court file includes a facsimile transmission report that indicates that the Opinion on and Order on Revocation Review was filed and successfully transmitted via facsimile to the Appellants’ counsel on February 21, 2006. Appellants’ Notice of Appeal to this Court was signed, dated and mailed on March 1, 2006 and filed in the Tribal Court on March 3, 2006 – four days past the statutory deadline for filing.2
Appellants argue that the filing deadline set forth in the Sauk-Suiattle Law and Order Code should not apply because of alleged procedural improprieties by the Tribe and the Tribal Court. Appellees argue for strict application of the statutory filing deadline, citing several decisions from other jurisdictions upholding strict application of extremely short filing deadlines. We find neither argument compelling.
The cases cited by the Appellee where short appeal deadlines were upheld all involved deadlines triggered by actual notice of the adverse decision. See, e.g., Spradlin v. Borough of Danville, 2005 WL 3320788 (slip op.) (M.D. Penn. Dec. 7, 2005) at 6 (statute provides "[a] property owner receiving a Notice of Violation ... has five days from the date of receipt to mail or deliver a simple statement ...); Starks v. Kopfler, 468 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1972) (upholding five day deadline for filing notice of appeal and bond triggered by "rendition of judgment," "rendition" being defined by Black's as the declaration of the judgment in open court, as opposed to entry of judgment, which is a purely ministerial act); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)
7 NICS App. 111, IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF JULIE BILL MEZA, ET AL. (October 2006) p. 115
(upholding statutory requirement that trial be held no later than six days after service of the complaint on the tenant).3 The Sauk-Suiattle Law and Order Code includes no such provision that a party must receive actual notice of an adverse decision before the five-day appeal period begins to run. A statute barring an appeal of an adverse decision of which a party may have never received notice raises serious due process concerns. Although the Tribal Court’s facsimile transmission report indicates that the Court’s February 21 Opinion was successfully transmitted to Appellants’ counsel, nothing in the record indicates when Appellants’ counsel actually received the facsimile and Appellees have produced no authority that service by facsimile should be treated the same as service by mail.4 While this Court is not prepared to hold §2.140 of the Law and Order Code invalid based on the record and briefing before us, neither are we prepared to strictly apply it in a case such as this where there is no evidence before the Court as to when the Appellants received actual notice of the decision and the subject matter of the appeal involves an issue as important as revocation of Tribal Membership. Based on the foregoing considerations, and without setting a precedent regarding future appeals, this Court believes this particular appeal should be heard.
B. Tribal Council’s Revocation Decision
The Appellants argue that the Tribal Council’s decision to revoke their Tribal memberships was clearly unsupported by the record of decision. This Court disagrees.
The governing authority outlining the enrollability of an individual into the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe is contained in the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribal Community Constitution and Bylaws, Article II, Membership, Section 1, which states:
The membership in the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe shall extend to the following persons provided they do not hold membership in another tribe except as provided for under the provisions of honorary membership.
(A) All persons of Sauk-Suiattle Indian blood whose names appear on the Skagit-Suiattle (Public Domain) census roll dated January 1, 1942.
7 NICS App. 111, IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF JULIE BILL MEZA, ET AL. (October 2006) p. 116
(B) All persons who possess at least one-fourth (1/4) Indian blood born since the date of said roll who are direct descendants of persons named on the base roll.
(C) Corrections may be made in kthe [sic] tribal membership roll at any time by the tribal council, subject to the approval of the secretary of the interior or his authorized representative.
Turning to the facts at bar, the Tribal Council’s record of decision makes clear that the Appellants do not qualify for enrollment pursuant to the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribal Community Constitution and Bylaws, Article II, Membership, Section 1: (1) none of the Appellants appear on the Skagit-Suiattle (Public Domain) census roll dated January 1, 1942; (2) none of the Appellants, all of whom were born since the date of the Skagit-Suiattle (Public Domain) census roll dated January 1, 1942, are direct descendants of persons named in the Skagit-Suiattle (Public Domain) census roll dated January 1, 1942; and (3) the Tribal Council has not corrected the Tribal membership roll to add any of the Appellants. The record of decision does not contain any credible evidence showing that Emily Joe Bill should be properly listed on the Skagit-Suiattle (Public Domain) census roll dated January 1, 1942. Therefore, thisCourt holds that the decision of the Tribal Council revoking the Appellants’ membership based on the evidence that the Appellants did not meet the qualifications for enrollment in the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe because the Appellants had no direct decendancy from anyone listed on the Skagit-Suiattle (Public Domain) census roll dated January 1, 1942, was not clearly unsupported by the record of decision.
C. Procedural Due Process
The Appellants argue that their procedural due process rights were violated because they were not allowed to enter evidence at the Tribal Council’s special meetings and because the evidence utilized in enacting Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88 was no longer available. This Court disagrees.
The essence of due process is that a party must have reasonable notice of a hearing, the time to prepare for the hearing and the opportunity to be heard at that hearing. Gallaher v. Foster, 29 Indian L. Rep. 6079 (Colv.Ct.App. 2002). Turning to the facts at bar, the Tribal Council continued the special meeting to consider the revocation of Resolution 19/88 on May 16, 2006, to June 15, 2006, to allow the Appellants additional time to prepare for the hearing and gather evidence to submit to the Tribal Council. After the Tribal Council rescinded Resolution 19/88, Appellants did not appeal that decision.
Appellants received timely notice of and an opportunity to prepare for the Tribal Enrollment Committee’s administrative hearings to revoke the Appellants’ membership which hearings were held on October 3, 2005, for some Appellants, and on November 1, 2005, for the other Appellants. The Appellants were given the opportunity to present evidence at the Tribal
7 NICS App. 111, IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF JULIE BILL MEZA, ET AL. (October 2006) p. 117
Council’s hearings to revoke the Appellants’ membership. The Appellants did not present any credible evidence to support their position that they should not be disenrolled at either hearing.
Finally, and though the Court is sympathetic to the Appellants because the evidence relied on by the Tribal Council in enacting Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88 was lost or missing, the record is devoid of any efforts made by the Appellants to obtain any formal discovery from the Tribe in this matter regarding the lost or missing evidence: no motions for discovery and/or to compel discovery were filed; no interrogatories were submitted to the Tribe; and no depositions were taken.
Therefore, the Court holds that the Tribal Council did not violate the Appellants’ procedural due process. The Appellants had proper notice of all hearings, the opportunity to prepare, including obtaining discovery, and the opportunity to be heard at all of the hearings.
D. Equitable Estoppel
The Appellants argue that the Tribe should be estopped from revoking their membership based on equitable considerations. Specifically, the Appellants seem to argue that: (1) the Tribal Council enacted Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88, which allowed the Appellants to become enrolled Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribal members; (2) the Appellants detrimentally relied on Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88; and (3) the Appellants would be injured as a result of their membership revocation. In addition, the Appellants argue that this Court should take into consideration the fact that the evidence relied on by the Tribal Council in enacting Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88 was lost or missing. Though the Court is sympathetic to the Appellants’ position, the Court disagrees.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to governmental administrative decisions. Kramarevcky v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 122 Wn.2d 738, 863 P.2d 535 (1993). A party asserting equitable estoppel against a governmental administrative agency must show evidence of (1) an admission, statement or act by the agency inconsistent with its earlier claim; (2) reliance on that admission, statement or act; (3) injury to the relying party if the agency were allowed to contradict or repudiate its earlier admission, statement or act; (4) the necessity of estoppel to prevent a manifest injustice; and (5) no impairment of governmental functions if estoppel is applied. Kramarevcky, 122 Wn.2d at 734-44.
There is no question that the Tribal Council’s rescission of Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88 is inconsistent with the Tribal Council’s earlier act. Though the Appellants may be injured, no evidence of injury or damages was presented at trial. There may be a manifest injustice by revoking the Appellants’ membership. There appears that there would be no impairment of any Tribal function if the Court applied estoppel in this matter. The key issue in this matter is whether the Appellants can justifiably rely on the Tribal Council’s enactment of Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88. This Court thinks not.
7 NICS App. 111, IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF JULIE BILL MEZA, ET AL. (October 2006) p. 118
Any Tribal Council or governmental legislative body has the right, and the duty in some cases, to rescind previously passed legislation that was enacted based on erroneous information. The Tribal Council discovered that Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88, amending the Skagit-Suiattle (Public Domain) census roll dated January 1, 1942, by adding the name of Emily (Joe) Bill, was not supported by evidence. Upon making this finding, the Tribal Council properly rescinded Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88. The time to challenge that revocation was when the Tribal Council rescinded Resolution No. 19/88, not when the Enrollment Committee disenrolled Appellants based on their failure to meet the enrollment criteria.
As stated above, the Court is sympathetic to the Appellants because the evidence relied on by the Tribal Council in enacting Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88 was lost or missing. However, the Appellants cannot claim justifiable reliance on Sauk-Suiattle Resolution No. 19/88 because the Appellants did not present any credible evidence showing that Emily Joe Bill should be listed on the Skagit-Suiattle (Public Domain) census roll dated January 1, 1942. In addition, as noted above, the record is devoid of any efforts made by the Appellants to obtain any formal discovery from the Tribe in this matter for the lost or missing evidence. Therefore, the Appellants have failed to show that the Tribe should be estopped from revoking their membership based on equitable considerations.
E. Sanctions
The Appellants argue that the Tribal Court’s imposition of sanction in the amount of $150.00 was an abuse of the Tribal Court’s discretion. This Court disagrees.
The Tribal Court has the authority to find an attorney in contempt of Court pursuant to LOC § 3.100, Tribal Court Bar - Contempt of Court, which states:
Any advocate failing to maintain the respect due the Tribal Court or engaging in offensive conduct in the courtroom shall be deemed in contempt of court and subject to immediate sentencing by the Tribal Court Judge to confinement for a period not to exceed three (3) days, or a fine not to exceed on hundred dollars ($100.00) or both the confinement and fine. In appropriate cases exclusion from the reservation and tribal lands may be ordered and immediately enforced.
The Court can modify the Tribal Court’s decision pursuant to LOC § 2.170, Court of Appeals - Decision, which states:
The Court of Appeals may either affirm the trial court’s judgment as entered, modify it, remand it, or reverse the judgment by a majority vote, and its decision shall be final.
7 NICS App. 111, IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF JULIE BILL MEZA, ET AL. (October 2006) p. 119
Turning to the facts at bar, the Tribal Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions on the Appellants’ attorney for filing a late brief without either excuse or seeking a continuance as this behavior failed to maintain the respect due to the Tribal Court. However, the Tribal Court did abuse its discretion in imposing a $150.00 sanction. The Tribal Court also erred in ordering that the fine be paid to opposing Counsel. The Law and Order Code specifically requires “all” fines to be paid to the Tribal Court. LOC § 2.090 (“All fines, bonds, court costs and other assessments made by the court shall be paid to the clerk of the Court, who shall cause them to be deposited in a special Tribal Court Fund for disbursement by the Tribal Council.”) Thus, this Court modifies the Tribal Court’s amount of sanctions imposed to $100.00 and orders the fine to be paid to directly to the clerk of the Court consistent with the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe Law and Order Code §§ 3.100 and 2.090.
V. Conclusion and Order
Based on the foregoing, the Opinion and Order on Revocation Review entered by the Tribal Court on February 21, 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Order Regarding Sanctions entered by the Tribal Court on February 20, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED to the effect that the fine shall be reduced to one hundred dollars ($100.00) and payable directly to the clerk of the Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Court.
The syllabus is not a part of the Court's Opinion. The syllabus is a summary of the Opinion prepared by the publishers of this Reporter only for the convenience of the reader. Therefore, the syllabus should not be cited in whole or part as legal authority. Only the Opinion, which follows the syllabus, may be cited as legal authority.
At the time of these special meetings, the membership of the Tribal Enrollment Committee was the same as the membership of the Tribal Council and the Council appears to have been acting in the capacity of both Enrollment Committee and Council.
The fifth day following entry of the Tribal Court Opinion was a Sunday.
With the exceptions of a Connecticut mechanic’s lien statute and an Alabama probate statute requiring appeals to be filed within seven days of entry of judgment, all of the authorities cited in footnote 12 of the Tribal Council’s brief also indicate that the time period to file an appeal does not begin to run until the party has received actual notice of the adverse decision.
Although service by facsimile in lieu of personal service or service by mail or appears to be an accepted practice in Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Court, there is no code provision or Court rule that we are aware of that expressly provides for service by facsimile and neither party has presented argument or authority regarding whether, and if so when, service by facsimile should be deemed complete. We note that many jurisdictions automatically add time to filing deadlines when service by mail is substituted for personal service. See, e.g., Hoopa Valley Tribal Code § 2.2.23 (“When a time limit is counted from the time that notice is delivered to a person by mail, it shall be presumed that delivery takes place five days after notice is mailed.”)