7 NICS App. 127, SKOKOMISH TRIBE v. CHAPLIN (November 2006)
IN THE SKOKOMISH TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS
SKOKOMISH INDIAN RESERVATION
SKOKOMISH, WASHINGTON
Skokomish Indian Tribe, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Cheryl Ann Chaplin, Defendant/Appellant.
No. SKO-CI-3-06-071 (November 16, 2006)
SYLLABUS*
Trial court found that the non-Indian spouse of a tribal member had engaged in behavior that constituted a criminal offense and therefore granted the Tribal Prosecutor’s petition to exclude the non-Indian from the reservation. Court of Appeals ruled that all of the evidence demonstrated that the non-Indian spouse had been the victim of criminal activity, rather than the perpetrator; and that the Tribal Prosecutor and the trial judge committed numerous procedural errors in violation of the exclusion ordinance and court rules that denied the non-Indian spouse due process. Trial court order reversed.
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Michelle Demmert, Chief Justice; Greg Iverson, Justice; Darwin Long Fox, Justice. |
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Cheryl Ann Chaplin, pro se; Marilou Rickert, for the Skokomish Indian Tribe. |
OPINION
Per Curiam:
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no question that Indian tribes have the sovereign authority to exclude non-members from their reservations. At the same time, most tribes understand that exercising this authority arbitrarily or in violation of established procedures creates a climate that discourages the investment of time, energy and financial resources in the tribe and the reservation by the tribe’s business partners, tribal tenants, the non-member spouses and parents of tribal members,
7 NICS App. 127, SKOKOMISH TRIBE v. CHAPLIN (November 2006) p. 128
and other non-members who count on stability and the rule of law in making decisions whether or not to invest their time, energy and resources in the tribe and its members. For these reasons, the Skokomish Tribal Council adopted a Civil Exclusion and Removal Ordinance that sets forth in great detail the grounds for exclusion and the procedure for exclusion of a non-member. See Chapter 3.05 Skokomish Tribal Code, §§ 3.05.006 and 007. The Ordinance protects the rights of non-members, and protects the Tribe’s and its members’ relations with non-members, by specifying the fifteen acts which constitute grounds for exclusion. STC § 3.05.006.
In the case of the Appellant, Cheryl Ann Chaplin, the procedures specified in the Exclusion Ordinance were not followed and the record is devoid of any evidence whatsoever that the Appellant committed any of the fifteen acts listed in the code as grounds for exclusion. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court excluding the Appellant, Cheryl Anne Chaplin, from the Skokomish Indian Reservation for the reasons specified below.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Cheryl Chaplin, a non-member of the Skokomish Tribe, was married to Richard Giles, an enrolled member of the Tribe. It appears from the record that Ms. Chaplin and Mr. Giles are divorced, but that Ms. Chaplin has continued to live with Mr. Giles and their two children on the Skokomish Indian Reservation. Joan Pell, an enrolled member of the Tribe, is Mr. Giles’ mother. On September 19, 2005, Ms. Pell filed a one page handwritten complaint with the Tribal Council alleging that Ms. Chaplin had “knocked her around;” stolen about two thousand dollars worth of Pell’s belongings, including money, guns and jewelry; that Chaplin’s actions were the reason for numerous police calls to the Chaplin-Giles residence; and that Chaplin is “in drugs.” Pell appears to have followed up the written complaint with a telephone request to Council staff that she “would like her [Chaplin] kicked off the rez.”
Based on Ms. Pell’s allegations, without hearing from Ms. Chaplin, and without making any findings of its own as to whether the allegations were true, on November 30, 2005, the Tribal Council authorized the Tribal Attorney to take any and all actions necessary to protect all members of the tribal community, including, but not limited to, filing a complaint for exclusion. While the Council authorized the Tribal Attorney to file a complaint for exclusion, the Council did not direct the Tribal Attorney to do so, nor did the Council authorize a complaint to be filed in the name of the Council.
On March 29, 2006, the Tribal Attorney filed a Petition for Exclusion of a Non-Indian and a proposed Order of Exclusion with the Tribal Court.
Following a Notice of Show Cause Hearing, Mr. Giles (Ms. Chaplin’s husband/partner) filed a letter with the Tribal Court stating that to his knowledge, Ms. Chaplin had never stolen from or harmed his mother, Ms. Pell, in any way. Mr. Giles’ letter stated further that his mother
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had continuously meddled in Giles’ and Chaplin’s marital affairs. Ms. Chaplin also filed a letter with the Court denying all of Ms. Pell’s allegations.
A hearing on the merits was held on May 25, 2006. Although the Pell complaint and the Tribal Attorney’s proposed Order of Exclusion alleged that Ms. Chaplin had committed theft and assault against Ms. Pell, no evidence was presented on these allegations. Instead, the evidence presented at the hearing by the Tribal Attorney was limited to reports of domestic violence involving Ms. Chaplin and Mr. Giles in which Ms. Chaplin was the recognized victim. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge issued an oral decision granting the Petition for Exclusion. The judge expressed her concern that if Ms. Chaplin remained on the reservation, tribal police would have to continue to respond to reports of domestic violence at the Chaplin–Giles residence. The judge stated on the record “You (Chaplin) have engaged in repeated behavior that constitutes a criminal offense under the Skokomish Criminal Code.” On the same day, the trial judge signed and entered the Tribal Attorney’s proposed Order of Exclusion, which essentially mirrored the allegations in the petition, i.e., that the grounds for exclusion are that Ms. Chaplin assaulted and stole from Ms. Pell, conduct which constitutes Class B and Class C offenses under the Tribal Code, despite there being no evidence presented to support such findings.
Ms. Chaplin filed a Notice of Appeal on May 31, 2006. The Court of Appeals heard oral argument from both parties on September 26, 2006. Neither party availed itself of the opportunity offered by this Court to file written briefs.
III. JURISDICTION
The Tribal Court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Petition for Exclusion pursuant to STC § 3.05.003 (“The provisions of this Ordinance shall apply to all persons and property within the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribe to the fullest extent authorized by federal law”) and STC § 3.05.005(a) and (c). The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to STC § 3.05.007(g) (“Final Orders may be appealed to the Skokomish Tribal Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure”).
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The Skokomish Tribal Code is silent regarding the standard for appellate court review of a trial court decision. In the absence of any specified standard of review, we review issues of fact under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard and issues of law de novo.” Johns and McGhee v. Allen, No. SKO CV 06/03-171, at 1 (Skokomish Tribal Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2004) (6 NICS App. 196).
7 NICS App. 127, SKOKOMISH TRIBE v. CHAPLIN (November 2006) p. 130
V. ISSUES ON APPEAL
The Notice of Appeal filed by Ms. Chaplin, appearing pro se, claims the trial court committed procedural error (“I was band [sic] for something else, and not the reason I was brought to court”) and factual error (“I did not do what I was accused of and that is wrong”).
The Skokomish Tribal Code provides that “[t]he rules of procedure for the Skokomish Tribal Court shall be liberally interpreted and applied to achieve the following purposes: revealing the truth, treating all parties fairly and without prejudice, protecting individual rights guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act and the Skokomish tribal constitution, resolving disputes efficiently.” STC § 3.01.012(b).
In more formal legal terms, the issues raised by this appeal can thus be stated as:
(1) Were the procedures for exclusion of a nonmember set forth at STC § 3.05.007 followed?
(2) Did the lower court violate Appellant’s due process rights by allowing evidence beyond the scope of the petition?
(3) Were grounds for exclusion under STC § 3.05.006 established by sufficient evidence?
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Improper Procedure
The Exclusion Ordinance requires that specific procedures be followed for the Tribal Council’s review and again requires specific requirements for the Tribal Court’s review. These procedures were not followed as will be detailed below.
1. The Complaint
The procedure to exclude non-members requires a “complaint for exclusion” on a “form” provided by the “tribal manager” and that it is to be “signed” by the complaining witness and “delivered” to the Secretary of the Tribal Council. STC. 3.05.007(a)(1) (emphases added). Because the Ordinance requires that the complaint must be “signed” and “delivered,” it clearly must be in writing. If the Tribal Council determines that cause “may exist” for exclusion, the Council may then authorize the Tribal Prosecutor to file the complaint in the Tribal Court along with a petition for exclusion. STC § 3.05.007(a)(4). Following notice from the Tribal Court to the non-member named in the complaint, which must include service of the complaint, the petition for exclusion and the resolution authorizing initiation of exclusion proceedings, a hearing is then held before the Court. STC § 3.05.007(b) and (c). “Except as specifically
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provided [in the Ordinance], the Rules of Civil Procedure of the Tribal Court shall apply to an exclusion hearing.” STC § 3.05.007(c)(1). Exclusion proceedings are civil in nature, thus Civil Rule 51 requires the filing of “a written complaint which describes the injury or breach at issue, names or describes the persons responsible for such injury or breach, and states the relief requested. Plaintiff shall sign the complaint.” STC § 3.01.051. The Rules provide that while no form is required for the court, “[a]ll pleadings should be clear and legible and shall contain the name of the court, the names of all the parties, the court file number of the case, the signature of the party filing it or of the party’s representative, and any other information required by these rules…” Title S.T.C 3.01.06(b).
The Procedures for Exclusion of a Non-Member permit “[t]he Tribal Council, the Director of the Skokomish Department of Public Safety, the Director of the Department of Natural resources, or any enrolled tribal member” to make a complaint to the Tribal Council for their consideration. STC § 3.05.007 (a). The Tribal Council then considers the request and if it “has reason to believe that cause may exist for exclusion proceedings, the Tribal Council may, in its sole discretion, initiate exclusion proceedings by resolution authorizing the Tribal Prosecutor to file the complaint and petition.” STC § 3.05.007(b). In this case, we have an enrolled tribal member make a complaint to the Tribal Council, and the Tribal Council authorizing the Tribal Attorney to act as the tribal prosecutor “to take any and all actions necessary to protect all members of the tribal community in this matter, including, but not limited to, filing a complaint for exclusion in the Skokomish Tribal Court against Cheryl Ann Chaplin.” Resolution 05-131.
The Tribal Attorney, acting as the Tribal Prosecutor for the purposes of this proceeding, filed a petition for Exclusion but failed to file a complaint signed by the Plaintiff to the lawsuit. A Petition is a formal written request to a court for an order of the court. It is distinguished from a complaint in a lawsuit, which asks for damages and/or performance by the opposing party. The Exclusion Ordinance envisions that both a complaint and a petition will be filed upon initiating an action of exclusion. See, STC § 3.05.007(a)(4) and (b).
Ms. Pell’s handwritten complaint to the Tribal Council does not meet the procedural requirements of the Skokomish Tribal Code, which was filed along with the Tribe’s Petition For Exclusion of a Non-Indian. The written complaint that Ms. Pell signed and delivered to the Tribal Council makes a number of allegations against Ms. Chaplin, but on its face does not request any specific action by the Tribal Council. At some point after delivering her written complaint, Ms. Pell apparently made a telephone call in which she stated “I would like her (Ms. Chaplin) kicked off the rez,” but this statement was not part of the written complaint signed by Ms. Pell. Ms. Pell’s complaint was therefore defective in at least two respects: first, the request for exclusion was not in writing as required by the Ordinance, and second, the request for exclusion was not signed. The trial court erred in failing to require strict compliance with the procedures governing a complaint for exclusion. While Ms. Pell’s complaint at the Council level may have been sufficient for their action, it is insufficient for the court to take such a serious action.
7 NICS App. 127, SKOKOMISH TRIBE v. CHAPLIN (November 2006) p. 132
In addition, due to how the Exclusion Ordinance is drafted, it is not entirely clear whether the complaining party to the Tribal Council would be the Complainant in the court, or if the Complainant would be the Tribal Council through the “acting Tribal Prosecutor.” If the intention is the former than there are additional issues that need discussion.
For instance, if under the Ordinance, Ms. Pell is the Complainant, then there was a shift regarding the role of the parties in this proceeding and this shift would have seriously prejudiced Ms. Chaplin. Ms. Pell filed her complaint with the Tribal Council on September 19, 2005. The Tribal Council authorized the Tribal Attorney to file a petition for exclusion on November 30, 2005. Although the Tribal Council “authorized” the Tribal Attorney to take certain actions, including filing the petition, there is nothing in the record that indicates that the Council directed the Tribal Attorney prepare a complaint and the Council itself did not prepare or file a complaint of its own. It was not until March 29, 2006 – more than six months after Ms. Pell filed her complaint with Council – that the Tribal Attorney actually filed her petition for exclusion in the Tribal Court. The complaining party before the Council was Ms. Pell, whereas the complaining party before the trial court – i.e., the party designated as Plaintiff in the caption of the petition - was identified by the Tribal Attorney as the Tribe itself. Ms. Pell’s role shifted from that of Complainant to that of witness. Is this shift in roles contemplated by the Exclusion Ordinance, or is the Tribal Council through the acting Tribal Prosecutor the intended Complainant?
We find it troubling that the Exclusion Ordinance does not seem to specifically require the “Petitioner” to also be the “Complainant” in an exclusion proceeding and thereby allows this shifting of roles to occur. This procedure strikes us to be at odds with the Skokomish Rules of Civil Procedure, which anticipate that every civil proceeding will be initiated by a “complaint,” that pleadings be “clear,” and that the real parties in interest be named. The problems caused by allowing a petition to be filed in the name of someone other than the complaining party are clearly presented in the case at bar, where it appears that we have the Tribal Attorney filing a petition on her own initiative several months after receiving a very broad grant of discretion from the Tribal Council; naming the Tribe as the “plaintiff” even though the Tribe never prepared a complaint and the Tribal Council never made any affirmative decision directing a suit to be filed in its name; based on the complaint (and a defective complaint, at that) of a third party who made a point of having herself excused from even having to appear and give testimony at the court hearing.
Ms. Pell, not the Tribe, was the “complaining party” at the Council level. The Council authorized the Tribal Attorney to initiate an exclusion proceeding. To initiate such a proceeding requires a complaint and petition. A proper complaint was not filed. Furthermore, if the Tribe is acting as the Complainant, then it would have an obligation to ensure the accuracy of the allegations within a complaint if the issues for the exclusion come from a secondary source such as was done here – from an enrolled tribal member. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Tribe itself is properly named as “Plaintiff.” We therefore hold that the initial filing in
7 NICS App. 127, SKOKOMISH TRIBE v. CHAPLIN (November 2006) p. 133
this case was defective because only the Petition was filed without a proper Complaint -- both serve different purposes and both are required under the law. In addition, the Petition identified the Tribe as the Plaintiff. If the Tribe is acting as the Plaintiff that it is obligated to prepare a “complaint.”
We find it significant that § 3.05.007(b) (1) of the Exclusion Ordinance requires the notice of the court hearing on the petition to be sent to the “complaining party.” We view the requirement of STC § 3.05.007(a)(4) that the Council authorize the filing of the complaint and the petition with the Tribal Court as a prohibition against unauthorized suits, not as a grant of authority for the Tribal Attorney to substitute the Tribe or Tribal Council for the complaining party without more of an indication providing for this result. Nothing in the Ordinance suggests that the Tribe should be identified as the “Plaintiff” or substituted for the “complaining party” if the Tribe does not prepare and file a complaint of its own. Indeed, with the exception of granting the ministerial power to “to file the complaint and petition the Tribal Court to serve notice upon the non-member,” the exclusion ordinance on its face does not grant the Tribal Attorney any authority to appear or represent the complaining party when the complaining party is not the Tribe itself.
2. Due Process
We take Ms. Chaplin’s claim in her Notice of Appeal that she was banned “for something else, and not the reason I was brought to court,” to constitute a claim that she was not provided adequate notice. We agree. The exclusion ordinance expressly states “[t]he notice shall state the reason for the proposed exclusion.” STC § 3.05.007(b)(1). The reasons for exclusion stated in the petition and complaint alleged that Ms. Chaplin had assaulted and stolen from Ms. Pell.1 Ms. Chaplin appeared at the hearing prepared to defend herself against these charges. As discussed in detail below, the Tribal Attorney presented no evidence whatsoever that Ms. Chaplin had committed theft or assault, and instead presented only evidence that Tribal Police had responded to domestic violence calls at the Chaplin–Giles residence involving Ms. Chaplin and Mr. Giles. Ms. Chaplin was not given adequate notice or opportunity to prepare to defend herself against the evidence actually heard by the trial court. It is fundamental due process that you provide a responding or defending party with notice of the allegations prior to the hearing in the Petition and the Complaint. Any primary evidence, that being presented by the initiating party, that is beyond the pleadings fails to afford the responding party the process that is due and should be excluded. The court could have recessed this case and allowed the Tribe to amend its Petition and allow Ms. Chaplin time to prepare an adequate defense, but it did not do this. Instead, it allowed such presentation of evidence, thus violating Ms. Chaplin’s Due Process under the
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Skokomish Constitution. See Article IX. Furthermore, it seems clear to us that the problems discussed above regarding the complaint and the petition and the ambiguous, shifting roles of the Tribal Attorney, Ms. Pell and the Tribe as Petitioner, complaining party, plaintiff and attorney contributed greatly to the lack of proper notice to Ms. Chaplin.
B. Insufficient Evidence and Failure to Establish Grounds for Exclusion
The only documentary evidence produced at the hearing on the merits consisted of two police reports, one dated September 6, 2005 and the other dated September 19, 2005. The September 6 report stated that Mr. Giles had been arrested, indicating that Ms. Chaplin was the victim, not the perpetrator, of this domestic violence incident. The September 19 report indicated that Ms. Chaplin was not in violation of a restraining order prohibiting her from being in the Giles home. Indeed, the September 19 report, which was triggered by a complaint from Ms. Pell, indicates that when police arrived, they found no evidence Chaplin had even been there. The date of this incident, September 19, 2005, is the same day that Ms. Pell delivered her complaint to the Tribal Council.
At the hearing on the merits, the sole witness for the Petitioner was Lt. Digrigoli of the Skokomish Police Department. Lt. Digrigoli offered largely opinion testimony that Tribal Police had responded to four or five domestic violence incidents at the Chaplin-Giles residence (rather than “at least nine times” as alleged by Ms. Pell in her complaint to the Council), but he was unable to testify to the specific reasons for the calls other than for the two incidents in which the police reports were introduced as evidence. He testified that the “pattern” at that household is Mr. Giles assaults Ms. Chaplin, he is arrested for assault, and Ms. Chaplin leaves the home. Lt. Digrigoli expressed his concern that the domestic violence calls will continue and his concern that there are not enough police resources to respond appropriately where there is a “… volatile situation in the household that poses a threat to the community.”
Lt. Digrigoli testified that on one occasion he had seen Mrs. Pell give Ms. Chaplin $100.00. Later he testified he knew or learned that the payment was for a debt Mr. Giles owed Ms. Chaplin, which was paid by Ms. Pell on her son’s behalf. Lt. Digrigoli could not and did not testify regarding any other reports or complaints lodged with the Skokomish Police Department.
No documentary evidence was introduced to support the officer’s “belief” that there had been more than two police responses to incidents at the home, and the officer acknowledged he only had personal knowledge of the September 6 incident at which Mr. Giles was arrested. No documentary evidence was submitted indicating Ms. Chaplin had ever been charged or even investigated for any of the activities listed in Ms. Pell’s complaint to the Tribal Council.2 No evidence was introduced at trial supporting any of Ms. Pell’s original allegations.
7 NICS App. 127, SKOKOMISH TRIBE v. CHAPLIN (November 2006) p. 135
Ms. Pell’s letter to the Council was included in the file, but for what purpose is not entirely clear; even so, it was not authenticated or formally submitted as evidence. At oral argument, the Tribal Attorney acknowledged that Ms. Pell’s complaint to the Tribal Council had been filed with the petition to demonstrate compliance with the procedural requirements of the Exclusion Ordinance, but that the handwritten document had never been introduced as evidence. Even if Ms. Pell’s handwritten complaint had been introduced as evidence, it most likely would have been disallowed, or the hearing continued, because Tribal Court Rule 45 only allows the testimony of a witness to be presented in written form “if the witness is unable to appear in person to testify, if the evidence presented in writing is not contradicted by other parties, or if the written testimony is offered to support a motion or an uncontested request for relief.” STC 3.01.045(a). Furthermore, “[t]estimony should be given under oath if possible.” Id. Ms. Pell did not appear at the hearing.
Leona Cooper testified on behalf of Ms. Chaplin. Ms. Cooper testified that she has known Ms. Chaplin for four years and that Ms. Chaplin has worked for Ms. Cooper for one and a half years at Ms. Cooper’s home and at her restaurant. Ms. Cooper testified she has no knowledge of Ms. Chaplin stealing anything from anyone. Ms. Cooper further testified there was an occasion when she had seen Ms. Pell and Ms. Chaplin in a “mutual dispute,” which occurred when Ms. Chaplin was leaving the Giles-Chaplin household and Ms. Pell appeared and yelled at Ms. Chaplin. She saw “nothing physical” between them.
Ms. Chaplin testified on her own behalf. She testified that she has never assaulted Ms. Pell in any way at any time; she has never stolen anything from Ms. Pell; she has never been to Ms. Pell’s house without an invitation; the “drugs” mentioned in Pell’s complaint were prescribed for her Multiple Sclerosis (which were stolen from her refrigerator); and Mr. Giles owed her $100.00 which was paid by his mother, Ms. Pell.
Thus, the record before the trial court contained the unsworn handwritten “complaint” presented by Ms. Pell to the Tribal Council; two Public Safety “incident reports” admitted into evidence indicating that Ms. Chaplin ws the victim, not the perpetrator of domestic violence, and was not even at the Giles-Chaplin residence on at least one occasion that Ms. Pell complained of, calling Ms. Pell’s credibility into serious question; and the testimony of Lt. Digrigoli of the Skokomish Police Department, which also indicated Ms. Chaplin had been the victim, not the perpetrator, of domestic violence. Based on this record, the trial judge entered an order banishing Ms. Chaplin from the reservation stating that Chaplin had, “on a number of occasions, knocked … Pell … around, including knocking her to the ground,” and that Chaplin had “on a number of occasions, stolen money, guns, jewelry, and other items totaling several thousand dollars in value, from the home of Joan Pell.”
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Ms. Chaplin challenges both the sufficiency and relevance of the evidence upon which the trial court based its findings and conclusions. Appellant points out that the police reports admitted did not support the allegations that she had assaulted or stolen from Ms. Pell, but rather showed she had been the victim of domestic violence, and had not violated a restraining order. Appellant urges that the testimony of the Petitioner’s only witness, Officer Digrigoli, and the documentary evidence admitted were both insufficient to support the trial court’s findings. We agree with Ms. Chaplin.
Upon the conclusion of the hearing on the merits, the trial judge indicated in her oral ruling that her primary reason for excluding Ms. Chaplin was the potential for future police calls regarding alleged domestic violence at the Chaplin-Giles residence. As discussed above, no evidence was introduced showing that Ms. Chaplin had been the perpetrator of domestic violence and the evidence actually tended to show that Ms. Chaplin had been the repeated victim of domestic violence. Being the victim of domestic violence is certainly not among the fifteen grounds for exclusion listed in the ordinance, nor is future potential conduct listed among the fifteen grounds for exclusion.
The trial court’s written order of exclusion is based on its factual findings that “Defendant has, on a number of occasions, knocked Skokomish Tribal Member Joan Pell, a 75-year-old woman, around, including knocking her to the ground,” and “Defendant has, on a number of occasions, stolen money, guns, jewelry and other items, totaling several thousand dollars in value, from the home of Joan Pell.” As discussed above, no evidence whatsoever was introduced or admitted supporting these findings.
VII. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
We hold that the trial court’s findings of fact (oral and written) are clearly erroneous as they are unsupported by proper documentary or testimonial evidence, and are contradicted directly by sworn direct testimony from the Appellant, her witness and Officer Digrigoli. Being the victim of domestic violence is not conduct within the meaning of the law authorizing the exclusion of the Appellant, and no other grounds for exclusion under the ordinance were established.
We also hold that the complaint, the petition, and the notice provided to Ms. Chaplin each failed to meet the requirements of the Exclusion Ordinance. In the spirit of STC § 3.01.012(e), which provides that “Judges and the administrator of the Tribal Court have a duty to tell the Skokomish Tribal Council which additional rules are needed to govern common procedural questions faced by the court,” we encourage the Tribal Council to review the procedures in the Exclusion Ordinance and consider whether it would be appropriate to better define the roles of the complaining party, the Petitioner, and the Tribal Council when the Tribe is not the initiating or complaining party, so as to avoid future problems such as those that arose in this proceeding.
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Furthermore, we hold that the evidence presented by the Petitioner was beyond the scope of that alleged within the petition, thus should have been excluded.
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that the trial court’s Order of Exclusion, dated May 25th, 2006, is reversed. The Appellant, Cheryl Chaplin, may return to the Skokomish Indian Reservation when and how she chooses.
The syllabus is not a part of the Court's Opinion. The syllabus is a summary of the Opinion prepared by the publishers of this Reporter only for the convenience of the reader. Therefore, the syllabus should not be cited in whole or part as legal authority. Only the Opinion, which follows the syllabus, may be cited as legal authority.
The petition and complaint also allege that Ms. Pell contacted the police about the Appellant on numerous occasions, but Ms. Pell’s calls to the police cannot constitute grounds for exclusion, as seems to be recognized in the petition, wherein the prayer for relief is limited to findings that Appellant engaged in conduct which constituted Class B and Class C offenses under Title 9 of the Skokomish Tribal Code.
We note that the theft of firearms qualifies as a federal offense and under the tribal criminal code, it qualifies as “Theft” pursuant to STC § 9.03.090. It is perplexing that if Ms. Pell’s many serious allegations against Ms. Chaplin were credible, why the Petitioner was unable to produce evidence that any of these allegations had ever been investigated or prosecuted by the Tribe.