Chapter 9.04 GENERAL PROVISIONS

B. The provisions of this title shall apply to any offense committed on or after April 7, 1980, which is defined in this title or the general statutes, unless otherwise expressly provided or unless the context otherwise requires, and shall also apply to any defense to prosecution for such an offense.

C. The provisions of this title do not apply to or govern the construction of and punishment for any offense committed prior to the effective date of the ordinance codified in this title, or to the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense. Such an offense must be construed and punished according to the provisions of law existing at the time of the commission thereof in the same manner as if the ordinance codified in this title had not been enacted. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.010)

9.04.020 Definitions.

As used in this Title 9, words used in the present tense include the future tense; any gender pronouns or references include masculine, feminine, intersex, transgender, and neutral genders; and the singular includes the plural and vice versa. In this title, unless a different meaning plainly is required:

A. “Acted” includes, where relevant, “omitted to act.”

B. “Actor” includes, where relevant, a person failing to act.

C. “Benefit” means any gain or advantage to the beneficiary, including any gain or advantage to a third person pursuant to the desire or consent of the beneficiary.

D. “Bodily injury” or “physical injury” means physical pain, illness or an impairment of physical condition.

E. “Building,” in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any dwelling, fenced area, vehicle, railway car, cargo container or any other structure used for lodging of persons or for carrying on business therein, or for the use, sale or deposit of goods; each unit of a building consisting of two or more units separately secured or occupied is a separate building.

F. “Deadly weapon” means any explosive or loaded or unloaded firearm, and includes any other weapon, device, instrument, article or substance, including a “vehicle” as defined in this section, which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

G. “Dwelling” means any building or structure, though movable or temporary, or a portion thereof, which is used or ordinarily used by a person for lodging.

H. “Government” includes any branch, subdivision or agency of the government of this state and any county, city, district or other local governmental unit.

I. “Governmental function” includes any activity which a public servant is legally authorized or permitted to undertake on behalf of a government.

J. “Indicted” and “indictment” include “informed against” and “information,” and “informed against” and “information” include “indicted” and “indictment.”

K. “Judge” includes every judicial officer authorized, alone or with others, to hold or preside over a court.

L. “Malice” and “maliciously” import an evil intent, wish or design to vex, annoy or injure another person. “Malice” may be inferred from an act done in willful disregard of the rights of another, or an act wrongfully done without just cause or excuse, or an act or omission of duty betraying a willful disregard of social duty.

M. “Officer” and “public officer” mean a person holding office under a city, county or state government, or the federal government, who performs a public function and in so doing is vested with the exercise of some sovereign power of government, and includes all assistants, deputies, clerks and municipal, county, state or federal law enforcement and employees of any public officer and all persons lawfully exercising or assuming to exercise any of the powers or functions of a public officer.

N. “Omission” means a failure to act.

O. “Peace officer” means a duly appointed city, county or state law-enforcement officer.

P. “Pecuniary benefit” means any gain or advantage in the form of money, property, commercial interest or anything else the primary significance of which is economic gain.

Q. “Person,” “he” and “actor” include any natural person and, where relevant, a corporation, joint stock association, or an unincorporated association.

R. “Place of work” includes but is not limited to all the lands and other real property of a farm or ranch in the case of an actor who owns, operates or is employed to work on such a farm or ranch.

S. “Prison” means any place designated by law for the keeping of persons held in custody under process of law, or under lawful arrest, including but not limited to any state correctional institution or any county or city jail.

T. “Prisoner” includes any person held in custody under process of law, or under lawful arrest.

U. “Property” means anything of value, whether tangible or intangible, real or personal.

V. “Public servant” means any person other than a witness who presently occupies the position of or has been elected, appointed or designated to become any officer or employee of government, including a legislator, judge, judicial officer, juror, and any person participating as an advisor, consultant or otherwise in performing a governmental function.

W. “Signature” includes any memorandum, mark or sign made with indent to authenticate any instrument or writing, or the subscription of any person thereto.

X. “Threaten” means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent to:

1. Cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or

2. Cause physical damage to the property of a person other than the actor; or

3. Subject the person threatened or any other person to physical confinement or restraint; or

4. Accuse any person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against any person; or

5. Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or

6. Reveal any information sought to be concealed by the person threatened; or

7. Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another’s legal claim or defense; or

8. Take wrongful action as an official against anyone or anything, or wrongfully withhold official action, or cause such action or withholding; or

9. Bring about or continue a strike, boycott or similar collective action to obtain property which is not demanded or received for the benefit of the group which the actor purports to represent; or

10. Do any other act which is intended to harm substantially the person threatened or another with respect to his health, safety, business, financial condition or personal relationships.

Z. “Vehicle” means a “motor vehicle” as defined in the vehicle and traffic laws, any aircraft, or any vessel equipped for propulsion by mechanical means or by sail. (Ord. 2998 § 1 (Exh, A), 2023; Ord. 2846 § 2 (Exh. A), 2014; Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.060)

9.04.030 Jurisdiction.

The following persons are liable to punishment:

A. A person who commits within this jurisdiction any crime, in whole or in part;

B. A person who commits out of this jurisdiction any act which, if committed within it, would be theft, and is afterward found in this jurisdiction with any of the stolen property;

C. A person who, being out of this jurisdiction, counsels, causes, procures, aids or abets another to commit a crime in this jurisdiction;

D. A person who, being out of this jurisdiction, abducts or kidnaps by force or fraud any person, contrary to the laws of the place where the act is committed, and brings, sends or conveys such person into this jurisdiction;

E. A person who commits an act without this jurisdiction which affects persons or property within this jurisdiction; and

F. Any act committed by a voice call, a voice message, utilizing a phone, facsimile machine, computer, or other electronic or recorded means may be deemed to have been committed in this jurisdiction if either the place from which the act was committed or the place where the act was received is in this jurisdiction. (Ord. 2998 § 1 (Exh. A), 2023; Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.020)

9.04.035 Policy of nondiscrimination by criminal justice system.

It is the public policy of the city, under its inherent power to protect and safeguard its citizens by operating a criminal justice system, to direct its law enforcement personnel, prosecutors and court system to treat individuals without discrimination in regards to: gender appearance or identity, racial appearance or identity, religious expression or identity, national origin, sexual orientation, disability, or military/veteran status. In particular, as the city understands gender and racial appearance to be expressed in varied ways that do not always match legal identity, and consequently, in order to apply the law evenly and equally to all people and in the interests of public safety, officers are directed not to rely on first impressions in confirming the identity of any individual based on perceived gender and racial appearance alone. (Ord. 2846 § 2 (Exh. A), 2014)

9.04.040 Culpability of children.

A. Children under the age of eight years are incapable of committing crime. Children of eight and under 12 years of age are presumed to be incapable of committing crime, but this presumption may be resolved by proof that they have sufficient capacity to understand the act or neglect, and to know that it was wrong.

B. Whenever in legal proceedings it becomes necessary to determine the age of a child, he may be produced for inspection, to enable the court or jury to determine the age thereby; and the court may also direct his examination by one or more physicians, whose opinion shall be competent evidence upon the question of his age. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.030)

9.04.050 Common law to supplement.

The provisions of common law relating to the commission of crime and the punishment thereof, insofar as not inconsistent with the constitution and statutes of this state, shall supplement all penal statutes, of this state and all persons offending against the same shall be tried in the courts of this state having jurisdiction of the offense. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.040)

9.04.060 Degree of proof.

A. Every person charged with the commission of a crime is presumed innocent unless proved guilty. No person may be convicted of a crime unless each element of such crime is proved by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. When a crime has been proven against a person, and there exists reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees he is guilty, he shall be convicted only of the lowest degree. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.050)

9.04.070 Immunity of citizens aiding public officers.

Private citizens aiding a police officer, or other officer of the law, in the performance of their duties as police officers or officers of the law, shall have the same civil and criminal immunity as such officer, as a result of any act or omission for aiding or attempting to aid a police officer or other officer of the law, when such officer is in imminent danger of loss of life or grave bodily injury or when such officer requests such assistance and when such action was taken under emergency conditions and in good faith. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.070)

9.04.080 Omission performed by another.

No person shall be punished for an omission to perform an act when such act has been performed by another acting in his behalf, and competent to perform it. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.080)

9.04.090 Offenses involving letters.

Whenever any statute makes the sending of a letter criminal, the offense shall be deemed complete from the time it is deposited in any post office or other place, or delivered to any person, with intent that it shall be forwarded, and the sender may be proceeded against in the city wherein it was so deposited or delivered, or in which it was received by the person to whom it was addressed. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.090)

9.04.100 Costs to be paid.

Anyone convicted of an offense under any section of this code, or section of any city ordinance, must pay, in addition to any fine imposed and to the extent allowed by law, the costs of restitution, probation, jail, and any other fees the court imposes in its discretion or as required by law. Unpaid costs may result in pursuit of a civil judgment or use of a collection agency, and costs incurred in seeking those remedies will be imposed. (Ord. 2998 § 1 (Exh. A), 2023; Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.100)

9.04.110 Probation violations – Arrest.

Whenever a duly commissioned police officer of the police department has probable cause to believe that a probationer, prior to the termination of the period of his probation, is, in such officer’s presence, violating or failing to comply with any requirement or restriction imposed by the court as a condition of such probation, such officer shall cause the probationer to be brought before the court wherein sentence was deferred or suspended, and for such purpose the police officer may arrest the probationer without warrant or other process. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.110)

9.04.120 Requirements and kinds of culpability.

A. Kinds of culpability defined:

1. Intent. A person acts with “intent” or “intentionally” when he acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime.

2. Knowledge. A person “knows” or acts “knowingly” or “with knowledge” when:

a. He is aware of a fact, facts or circumstances or results described by a statute defining an offense; or

b. He has information which would lead a reasonable man in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offense.

3. Recklessness. A person is “reckless” or acts “recklessly” when he knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable man would exercise in the same situation.

4. Criminal Negligence. A person is “criminally negligent” or acts with “criminal negligence” when he fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable man would exercise in the same situation.

B. Substitutes for criminal negligence, recklessness and knowledge: When a statute provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally.

C. Culpability as determinant of grade of offense: When the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense is committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence, its grade of degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any material element of the offense.

D. Requirement of willfulness satisfied by acting knowingly: A requirement that an offense be committed willfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements plainly appears. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.130)

9.04.130 Guilt by conduct of another – Complicity.

A. A person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable.

B. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:

1. Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the crime, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or

2. He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by this title or by the law defining the crime; or

3. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of the crime.

C. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if:

1. With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he:

a. Solicits, commands, encourages or requests such other person to commit it, or

b. Aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or

2. His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.

D. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular crime himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.

E. Unless otherwise provided by this title or by the law defining the crime, a person is not an accomplice in a crime committed by another person if:

1. He is a victim of that crime; or

2. He terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the crime and either gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes a good faith effort to prevent the commission of the crime.

F. A person legally accountable for the conduct of another person may be convicted on proof of the commission of the crime and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the crime has not been prosecuted or convicted of a different crime or degree of crime or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.140)

9.04.140 Lawful use of force.

A. In this chapter, unless a different meaning is plainly required, “necessary” means that no reasonably effective alternative to the use of force appeared to exist and that the amount of force used was reasonable to effect the lawful purpose intended.

B. The use, attempt or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:

1. Whenever necessarily used by a public officer in the performance of a legal duty, or a person assisting him and acting under his direction;

2. Whenever necessarily used by a person arresting one who has committed a felony and delivering him to a public officer competent to receive him into custody;

3. Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his person, or a malicious trespass, or either malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary;

4. Whenever used in a reasonable and moderate manner by a parent or his authorized agent, a guardian, a master or teacher in the exercise of lawful authority, to restrain or correct his child, ward, apprentice or scholar;

5. Whenever used by a carrier of passengers or his authorized agent or servant, or other person assisting them at their request in expelling from a carriage, railway car, vessel or other vehicle, a passenger who refuses to obey a lawful and reasonable regulation prescribed for the conduct of passengers, if such vehicle has first been stopped and the force used is not more than shall be necessary to expel the offender with reasonable regard to his personal safety;

6. Whenever used by any person to prevent a mentally retarded person or a mentally ill person from committing an act dangerous to himself or another, or in enforcing necessary restraint for the protection of his person, or his restoration to health, during such period only as is necessary to obtain legal authority for the restraint or custody of his person. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.190)

9.04.150 Duress.

A. In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that:

1. The actor participated in the crime under compulsion by another who, by threat or use of force, created an apprehension in the mind of the actor that in case of refusal he or another would be liable to immediate death or immediate grievous bodily injury; and

2. That such apprehension was reasonable upon the part of the actor; and

3. That the actor would not have participated in the crime except for the duress involved.

B. The defense of duress is not available if the actor intentionally or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subject to duress.

C. The defense of duress is not established solely by a showing that a married person acted on the command of his or her spouse. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.200)

9.04.160 Entrapment.

A. In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that:

1. The criminal design originated in the mind of law enforcement officials, or any person acting under their direction; and

2. The actor was lured or induced to commit a crime which the actor had not otherwise intended to commit.

B. The defense of entrapment is not established by a showing, only, that law enforcement officials merely afforded the actor an opportunity to commit a crime. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.150)

9.04.170 Detainment for shoplifting investigation – Defense to actions.

A. In any criminal actions brought by reason of any person having been detained on or in the immediate vicinity of the premises of a mercantile establishment for the purpose of investigation or questioning as to the ownership of any merchandise, it shall be a defense of such action that the person was detained in a reasonable manner and for not more than a reasonable time to permit such investigation or questioning by a peace officer, by the owner of the mercantile establishment, or by the owner’s authorized employee or agent, and that such peace officer, owner, employee or agent had reasonable grounds to believe that the person so detained was committing or attempting to commit theft or shoplifting on such premises of such merchandise.

B. As used in this section:

1. “Reasonable grounds” shall include, but not be limited to, knowledge that a person has concealed possession of unpurchased merchandise of a mercantile establishment; and

2. “A reasonable time” means the time necessary to permit the person detained to make a statement or to refuse to make a statement, and the time necessary to examine employees and records of the mercantile establishment relative to the ownership of the merchandise. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.160)

9.04.180 Intoxication as defense.

No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular mental state is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the fact of his intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such mental state. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.170)

9.04.190 Restitution in lieu of fine.

A. If a person has gained money or property or caused a victim to lose money or property through the commission of a crime, upon conviction thereof the court, in lieu of imposing the fine authorized for the offense under BMC 9.04.230, may order the defendant to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not to exceed double the amount of the defendant’s gain or victim’s loss from the commission of a crime. Such amount may be used to provide restitution to the victim at the order of the court. In such case, the court shall make a finding as to the amount of the defendant’s gain or victim’s loss from the crime, and if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such finding the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue.

B. For the purposes of this section, “gain” or “loss” refer to the amount of money or the value of property or services gained or lost.

C. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section also applies to any corporation or joint stock association found guilty of any crime. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.1180)

9.04.191 Payment of fines.

When a defendant is sentenced to pay a fine or costs, the court may grant permission for payment to be made within a specified period of time or in specified installments. If no such permission is included in the sentence the fine or costs shall be payable forthwith.

A. When a defendant sentenced to pay a fine or costs defaults in the payment thereof or of any installment, the court on motion of the prosecuting attorney or upon its own motion may require him to show cause why his default should not be treated as contempt of court, and may issue a show cause citation or a warrant of arrest for his appearance.

B. Unless the defendant shows that his default was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the order of the court or a failure on his part to make a good-faith effort to make the payment, the court may find that his default constitutes contempt and may order him committed until the fine or costs, or a specified part thereof, is paid.

C. When a fine or assessment of costs is imposed on a corporation or unincorporated association, it is the duty of the person authorized to make disbursement from the assets of the corporation or association to pay the fine or costs from those assets, and his failure to do so may be held to be contempt unless he makes the showing required in subsection B of this section.

D. The term of imprisonment for contempt for nonpayment of a fine or costs shall be set forth in the commitment order, and shall not exceed one day for each $25.00 of the fine or costs, 30 days if the fine or assessment of costs was imposed upon conviction of a violation or misdemeanor, or one year in any other case, whichever is the shorter period. A person committed for nonpayment of a fine or costs shall be given credit toward payment for each day of imprisonment at the rate specified in the commitment order.

E. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the default in the payment of a fine or costs is not contempt, the court may enter an order allowing the defendant additional time for payment, reducing the amount thereof or of each installment or revoking the fine or costs or the unpaid portion thereof in whole or in part.

F. A default in the payment of a fine or costs or any installment thereof may be collected by any means authorized by law for the enforcement of a judgment. The levy of execution for the collection of a fine or costs shall not discharge a defendant committed to imprisonment for contempt until the amount of the fine or costs has actually been collected. (Ord. 1729 § 1, 1984)

9.04.200 Defense of city officers – Policy of city.

A. It is the public policy of the city under its police power to provide legal defense and make payment therefor from city funds to defend the acts of its officers in any civil action brought against them for a cause arising out of the performance of their official duties.

B. Prior to the authorization of employment of any such legal defense, as contemplated in this section, the city council, in regular session assembled, must find: (1) That the officer was acting in a matter in which the city had an interest; (2) That the officer was acting in discharge of a duty imposed or authorized by law; and (3) The officer acted in good faith. (Ord. 2998 § 1 (Exh. A), 2023; Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.260)

9.04.210 Defense of city officers – Findings required.

Repealed by Ord. 2298. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.270)

9.04.220 Copies of police records.

The chief of police shall have the power and it shall be his duty upon request and payment of the fee as provided herein to furnish certified copies of any records of the department, except those covered under the Security and Privacy Act. The chief of police shall charge and collect therefor the actual cost to the department and a minimum of $2.00. Any funds accruing to the chief of police under this section shall be given to the city treasurer and by him deposited into the current expense fund of the city. (Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.300)

9.04.221 Nonappearance in court.

Any person willfully violating his written and signed promise to appear in court is guilty of a misdemeanor regardless of the disposition of the charge upon which he was originally arrested; provided, that a written promise to appear in court may be complied with by an appearance by counsel. (Ord. 1727 § 1, 1984)

9.04.230 Misdemeanors – Classes – Penalties.

A. Except as specifically provided in this title, there shall be three classes of misdemeanors:

1. Gross Misdemeanor. Every crime previously classified in the Blaine Municipal Code as a Class A misdemeanor shall be deemed a gross misdemeanor. Every person convicted of a gross misdemeanor shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a maximum term, fixed by the court, of not more than one year, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than $5,000, or by both such imprisonment and fine.

2. Misdemeanor. Every crime previously classified in the Blaine Municipal Code as a Class B misdemeanor shall be deemed a misdemeanor. Every person convicted of a misdemeanor shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a maximum term, fixed by the court, of not more than 90 days, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than $1,000, or by both such imprisonment and fine.

3. Class C Misdemeanor. Every crime previously classified in the Blaine Municipal Code as a Class C misdemeanor shall retain that classification. Class C misdemeanors shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 only.

B. Unless otherwise provided, all offense in the Blaine Municipal Code shall be misdemeanors. (Ord. 2355 § 1, 1998; Ord. 1728 § 1, 1984; Ord. 1558 § 1, 1980; prior code § 6.01.120)

9.04.240 Community service and canine program fund assessment.

In any case where an accused has been convicted in Blaine municipal court of any drug and/or alcohol related crime, there shall be, in addition to any fine levied, an assessment in an amount no greater than $100.00 per conviction, which shall be nonsuspendable, which shall be paid into the community service and canine program fund. The fact that this penalty is imposed on each conviction shall not in any way reduce the obligation of the accused to pay the fine prescribed by ordinance and/or the court for the crime to which the conviction applies; provided, however, that total monetary penalties shall not exceed the maximum fine allowed by the Revised Code of Washington. (Ord. 2514 § 1, 2002; Ord. 2034 § 1, 1991)

9.04.260 Punishment consistent with state law.

Notwithstanding the punishment prescribed in this code for any violation thereof, the punishment for any offense in this code shall be the same as the punishment provided in state law for the same crime. (Ord. 2134 § 1, 1993)

9.04.270 Infraction monetary penalties – State statute regarding civil infraction penalty classifications and restitution adopted.

RCW 7.80.120, as drafted and amended hereafter, is adopted by reference into the Blaine Municipal Code and applicable throughout wherever Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, or Class 4 infractions are explicitly referenced. (Ord. 2998 § 1 (Exh. A), 2023)